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Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets
I.

INTRODUCTION

Texas discovery practice has changed dramatically in our
lifetimes. This change was not instantaneous. During the last
fifteen to twenty years, changes in philosophy and practice
have been building momentum-a momentum driven by the
desire for a broadened scope of discovery, for a system in
which the goal of discovery is to provide all parties with full
knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial.1 The most
crucial and publicly visible turning point, however, came with
the 1984 amendments to the discovery rules. After 1984, the
momentum continued in case law and additional rule changes,
all of which reinforced the philosophy of broad discovery. Recently, however, the Texas Supreme Court has hinted that the

1. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding)
(citing Gutierrez v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 729 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. 1987)).
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tide may be turning. Its recent opinions are beginning to retreat to a point at which parties may successfully protect relevant information from their opponents.2
A retreat would be ill-considered. While Texas discovery
practice had been structured to severely limit the exchange of
information, changes in the last decade allowed the discovery
process to come closer to fulfilling its promise of putting "unequal opponents on a more equal footing."' Changes in discovery practice broadened the scope of relevance and narrowed
the exemptions from discovery, helping those who, absent discovery, lack information crucial to their cases.4 Such changes
do not undermine the adversary system but help to correct one
of its inherent flaws-the unequal distribution of information
relevant to the dispute-by requiring a sharing of all such
relevant information prior to trial.5
The current state of the Texas discovery rules, both their
advances and their retreats, can be better understood in historical context. Knowing the background of the rules and the
past trends in the case law helps in understanding the current
status of the rules and may help in predicting the future direction of the discovery rules. This article discusses the current
scope of discovery in Texas, with an eye to where it came from
and where it may be going. More specifically, Part I examines
the scope of discovery relevance, with particular emphasis on
problematic recurring relevance issues; Part II explores the
discovery exemptions set out in Rule 166b of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure; Part III discusses the privileges established
by the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence; and Part IV looks at
various non-rule privileges that have been asserted as a bar to
discovery. We expect that this article will serve as a useful
tool for lawyers and judges trying to cope with day-to-day discovery issues and will also provide an analytical framework for
examining new discovery issues as they arise.

2. See, eg., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 751-52
(Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding) (holding that work product protection is perpetual).
3. Arthur B. LaFrance, Work-Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 DIC. L. Rsv.
351, 351 (1964).
4. See Alex W. Albright, The Texas Discovery Privilcgcs: A Fool' Game?, 70
TEX. L REV. 781, 785-86 (1992) (asserting that full disclosure prevents parties from
hiding facts and that protection from discovery is quite limited).
5. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 329 (1989) (stating that discovery is an attempt to 'overcome
the ... inequality of information-that undermines adversarial fact-finding').
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II. DiscovERY RELEVANCE
A.

Relevance Defined

Any discussion of discovery relevance must grow from an
understanding of trial relevance, and both the scope of discovery and the scope of trial relevance have broadened considerably in recent years. Relevant evidence in the trial sense is
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."6 This broad standard of relevance must be kept in
mind when considering whether information is relevant for
purposes of discovery.
Rule 166b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure sets out
the parameters of the scope of discovery relevance.' Litigants
generally may discover "any matter which is relevant to the
subject matter in the pending action whether it relates to the
claim or defense of any other party."' Discovery relevance is
even broader than trial relevance. Information is not exempt
from discovery because it will be inadmissible at trial.9 Rather, non-privileged information is discoverable if it "appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' ° This standard of discoverability encompasses any
information that might conceivably be material to a claim
which has been or might be pled in the lawsuit.
This broad definition of discovery relevance is limited,
however, by the requirement that the information sought be
"reasonably" calculated to lead to admissible evidence. In
applying this reasonableness test, courts have balanced the
probative value of the information sought and the burden upon
the party seeking discovery against the burden on the party
from whom discovery is sought.1" The discovering party's need

6. TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 401. Further, the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence provide
generally that all relevant evidence is admissible unless some specific provision
makes it inadmissible or unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay. See id. 402-403.
7.
See TEx. P. Civ. P. 166b. This rule is modeled in part on the federal rule's
scope of discovery. See FED. R Civ. P. 26.
8.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).

9.

Id.

10. Id.
11.
Id.
12. E.g., Independent Insulating Glass/Southwest, Inc. v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798,
803 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, orig. proceeding [leave denied]); Gordon v.
Blackmon, 675 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, orig. proceeding).
Note that large portions of the court's opinion in Gordon are lifted verbatim from
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for the information is usually given great weight, and the
courts repeatedly emphasize that discovery is favored. 3
The appellate courts generally give trial courts greater
leeway in relevance decisions than in ruling on privilege-based
objections to discovery. For example, in C-Tran Development
Corp. v. Chambers,14 the plaintiff sued various defendants for
breaching a contract to pay a ten percent commission on goods
sold by the defendants to purchasers in China.15 The trial
court ordered discovery of all of the plaintiffs contractual or
potential contractual relationships with suppliers or manufacturers of oil field equipment during 1984 and 1985." The
plaintiff challenged this discovery order in the mandamus proceeding, but the court of appeals denied its motion for leave to
file the petition. 17 The court stated:
Despite the apparent relaxation of the "abuse of discretion"
standard in mandamus proceedings, we feel we should not
substitute our judgment for that of a trial court in a ruling on
relevancy. We are especially hesitant to hold a trial judge has
abused his discretion when the standards governing his decisions are not clearly defimed. 8

the dissenting opinion in Jampole v. Touchy, 673 SAV.2d 569, 578 (Tex.1984, orig.
proceeding) (Barrow, J., dissenting).

13.

See, e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734

S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Tex.1987, orig. pro-

ceeding) (holding that a blanket protective order prohibiting discovery sharing was

an abuse of discretion and noting that modem discovery rules were designed to
'make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent') (quoting United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)); Jampole v. Touchy, 673
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984, orig. proceeding) (allowing discovery of all impact tests for
1967-79 on a variety of General Motors passenger cars in a case involving a 1976
Vega hatchback and explaining that 'the ultimate purpose of discovery is to seek the
truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts
are concealed"); see also General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 733-34
(Tex. 1983, orig. proceeding) (allowing discovery of test results pertaining to in-cab
gas tanks with protruding cab filler necks from 1949-72, regardless of direction of
impact, in a suit concerning a 1966 Chevrolet chassis cab truck).
14. 772 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th DiaL] 1989, orig. proceeding).
15. Id-at 295.
16. Id
17. Id. at 296.
18. Id. (citations omitted); see also Jeanne v. Millard, No. 01-88-00606-CV, 1988
Tex. App. LEXIS 1817, at °4-°5 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.], July 22, 1988, orig.
proceeding) (not designated for publication) (stating that '[i]n light of... the amorphous notions of relevancy and materiality we cannot conclude that the respondent
clearly abused his discretion"). But see General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651
S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1983, orig. proceeding) (stating that "[wle hold Judge
Lawrence's discovery order was overly broad .... Surely [such] information ... is
not relevant to this action").
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B. Recent Relevance Decisions
Within this framework of deference to the trial court and
balancing of materiality and burden, Texas courts have decided
a number of discovery relevance issues in the last few years.
The most litigated areas are issues of similarity of the discovery sought to the plaintiff's claims, discovery regarding a
defendant's net worth, discovery of information sought for purposes of impeachment, and a litigant's ability to compel someone to submit to a court-ordered physical or mental examination.
1. Similarity problems. Lawsuits, by their very nature,
concern a specific claim involving a specific set of facts. Litigants seeking discovery, however, are often interested in learning about related incidents, products, or claims. Accordingly,
courts have been faced with relevance controversies: how factually similar, or how close in time, does the discovery sought
need to be to the plaintiffs claim in order to be discoverable?
In product liability cases, for example, courts have rejected
attempts to limit discovery to the precise product in issue in
the case.19 If the information sought pertains to conditions
similar to those at issue in the case, the information is relevant
and discoverable.' If the manufacturer used other designs
which were safer than the one used in the product at issue,
information concerning those designs is discoverable because it
is relevant to show feasible alternatives.2 ' Similarly, in a
19. This trend may have begun with General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, which,
although it limited the discovery that had been allowed by the literal language of
the trial court's order, permitted discovery of crash test results from 1949 through
1972 in a suit concerning a 1966 truck and required production of tests concerning
different types of crashes from the crash that injured the plaintiff. 651 S.W.2d at
733-34.
20. Cf. McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 659 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983) (holding that the trial court should have admitted evidence of complaints to the defendant concerning wheel wobble regardless of the
speed at which the wobble occurred in the other incidents because the other incidents occurred under the same or similar circumstances), affid on other grounds, 673
S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Rush v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 646 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence of two previous fatal accidents because the
accidents occurred under similar circumstances); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546
S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding no
error in the court's decision that testimony regarding the same product model was
admissible).
21. See Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573-74 (Tex. 1984, orig. proceeding)
(noting that "[t]he automobiles need not be identical in order for tests on one to be
relevant in determining whether the design of another is defective" and that "wheth-
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breach of warranty/DTPA case, a court refused to limit discovery to windows identical to the one in issue or to the plaintiffs
own warranty, instead allowing discovery of past warranty
claims and complaints concerning several types of glass units
manufactured by the defendants.'
Additionally, pleading ingenuity can sometimes increase the
scope of discovery relevance. For example, in a bad-faith insurance case, the defendant insurance company opposed the
plaintiffs attempt to obtain discovery of its files showing other
insurance claims that had been denied, arguing that only the
plaintiffs individual file was relevant.' In a pure breach of
contract case, the defendant's objection would probably have
been sustained. However, given the plaintiffs claim of an improper pattern of claim denials, the court allowed discovery of
files in which denial was predicated on the
all the company's
24
exclusion.
same
2. Net worth. In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court decided
that a defendant's net worth is discoverable in a suit involving
the possible recovery of punitive damages.2 Because one purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, the
defendant's ability to pay damages is relevant to the proper
amount of damages to be assessed.' The court held, therefore,
that the plaintiff should have been allowed discovery of "financial statements and other documents bearing on the defendant's
net worth."27 Further, the court rejected the requirement that
the plaintiff do more than plead a cause of action that potentially entitled him to punitive damages before net worth discovery could be obtainedY In response to an argument that
plaintiffs may make frivolous punitive damage claims to obtain
net worth discovery, the court noted that the trial judge retained the authority "to consider on motion whether a party's

er a safer fuel system design suitable for one vehicle is adaptable to another is a
question of feasibility to be decided by the trier of fact, not a question to be resolved in ruling on discovery requests); see also Cantrell v. Hennessy Indus., Inc.,
829 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, n.w.h.) (finding the denial of discovery

regarding safety devices on different tire-changing machines to be reversible error).
Refer to notes 124-30 infra and accompanying text.

22.

Independent Insulating GlasaVSouthwest, Inc. v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798, 803-

04 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).

23.

Aztec Life Ins. Co. v. Dellana, 667 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App.-Austtin 1984,

orig. proceeding).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id
See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 471-73.
Id. at 471.
Id at 473.

252

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

discovery request involves unnecessary harassment or invasion
of personal or property rights."'
Since Lunsford, several cases have dealt with the
discoverability of net worth information. In Miller v. O'Neill,'"
the court of appeals rejected the trial court's attempt to delay
the discovery of net worth data until after a finding of liability
in a bifurcated trial."' The court likewise found no evidence to
32
support a claim of harassment or violation of privacy rights.
Finally, the court rejected an overbreadth claim and allowed
discovery of income tax returns and financial statements, including net worth statements of the defendants and any partnerships and professional corporations in which they had an interest for the years 1977 to 1987.' Similarly, in Hanna v.
Meurer,' the court of appeals rejected an argument that discovery regarding financial information was a per se invasion of
privacy rights.' Thus, the court allowed a deposition to be
taken to discover information regarding the defendants' net
worth.'
If the pleadings do not support a claim for punitive damages, however, net worth is not discoverable. In Al Parker Buick
Co. v. Touchy,17 the court of appeals, while recognizing that
information regarding net worth is discoverable in cases in
which punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded, granted
mandamus relief from the trial court's order compelling production of financial statements showing the net worth of the
defendant's employer.' The plaintiffs petition, although sufficient for the recovery of compensatory damages under the theory of respondeat superior, contained merely a conclusory request for punitive damages and failed to allege facts that would
establish the employer's liability for punitive damages.3 9 Because the plaintiffs petition was legally insufficient 'to support
an award of exemplary damages, the court explained that the
requested discovery had no probative value under the pleadings

29.
30.

Id.
775 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding).

31.
32.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.

33.
Id.
34.
769 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding) (en banc) (per
curiam).
35.
Id at 681.
36.
Id.
37.
788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
38.
Id. at 130.

39.

Id.
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and should have been denied by the trial court.40 The court
emphasized that a party is not required to establish a prima
facie case against the opposing party before becoming entitled
to pretrial discovery of that party's net worth, but "in the absence of pleadings that sufficiently allege that the relator is liable for exemplary damages, the relator's net worth is not a
'relevant matter.' "41
In cQntrast, in Delgado v. Kitzman,42 a personal injury
case arising out of an automobile collision, the plaintiffs pleading alleging that the defendant was "consciously indifferent" to
the safety of others was held to be sufficient to show the
defendant's potential liability for punitive damages." The trial
court's order protecting the defendant from having to disclose
any financial information was held to be an abuse of discretion
in the absence of evidence
substantiating the defendant's objec44
tion to such discovery.
3. Other financial information. The Texas Supreme Court
expressly left open in Lunsford the question of exactly what
type of financial evidence would be discoverable. 5 Commentators have suggested that general financial information, sales
figures, and even liability insurance may be admissible and are
almost certainly discoverable.48
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has now made it clear
that "net worth" discovery is not as broad as the commentators
have suggested. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez,47 for example, the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had
abused its discretion in ordering production of Sears' tax returns. 4' Sears had produced annual reports reflecting its net
worth and introduced an affidavit claiming that the annual
reports were accurate. 49 Further, Sears proffered evidence that
it would take an employee two or three weeks to duplicate the
requested five years' worth of tax returns.' The plaintiff did
40.

I& at 131.

41.
42.
43.

Id.
793 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
See id. at 333.
Id at 334.
See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 n.4 (Tex. 1988, orig. proceed-

44.

45.
ing).
46. See, eg., Gerald R. Po*ell & Cynthia A. Leiferman, Results Most Embar.
rassing. Discovery and Admissibility of Net Worth of the Defendant, 40 BAYLOR L
REv. 527, 529-34 (1988).
47. 822 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiarn).
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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not introduce evidence to challenge these assertions by
Sears.5 ' Under these facts, the court found that Sears should
not have been ordered to produce the returns.52 Thus, the
court allowed Sears to avoid producing admittedly relevant
information because it was "sensitive," because production
would be somewhat burdensome, and because the substance of
the information had been provided in a different and demonstrably reliable form.'
In Chamberlain v. Cherry, 4 one court of appeals went
even further. Because the plaintiff had not demonstrated that
financial statements reflecting the defendant's net worth were
unavailable, the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial
of discovery of income tax returns. 5 This result turns the
proper burdens upside down and should not be followed by
other courts.
4. Impeachment. Some courts seem particularly hesitant
to allow discovery when the information sought relates to the
impeachment of a potential witness. Twenty-two years ago, in
Russell v. Young,' the Texas Supreme Court disallowed discovery when "the potential witness is not a party to the lawsuit
and [his or her] credibility has not been put in issue and where
the records do not relate directly to the subject matter of the
pending suit and are sought to be discovered for the sole purpose of impeachment of such witness by showing his [or her]
bias and prejudice. 5 7 Unfortunately, the court muddied its
analysis by noting that until a person is called as a witness,
there is no one to impeach; hence, the desired impeachment
evidence was not relevant.8 Later, in Ex parte Shepperd,59
the court distinguished Russell, holding in a condemnation case
that appraisal reports prepared by the government's appraisal
witnesses, relating to land that was not the subject of the condemnation proceedings in which discovery was sought, were discoverable. 60 Likewise, two courts of appeals correctly followed

51.

Id.

52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
818 S.W.2d 201

55.

Id. at 207.

(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, orig. proceeding).

56. 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970, orig. proceeding).
57. Id. at 435.
58. Id. at 437.
59. 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
60. See id. at 816 (noting that Russell involved an attempt at "wholesale discovery of the private records of a non-party" and that the records were sought only to
show bias).
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Shepperd rather than Russell, allowing discovery
of information
1
for purposes of impeaching expert witnesses.
Not all courts, however, limited the scope of the Russell
impeachment exception. In W.W. Rodgers & Sons Produce Co.
v. Johnson,2 the court of appeals applied Russell and concluded that a request for production of "all statements, affidavits,
and summaries of interviews of witnesses to the accident and
any addendum, report, memo or summary" was properly refused because the documents were sought solely for impeachment purposes.'&This approach reflects an incorrect understanding of Russell but, the64 court's decision influenced trial
courts within its jurisdiction.
Even if the approach the court .took in Rogers and Sons
were correct, information not sought solely for impeachment
should be discoverable. In Kupor v. Solito,' the estate of Ruby
Lillian Durham and her daughters brought a wrongful death
suit against the defendant.6 Durham was a patient at the
defendant's dialysis center.' One day, "as she was receiving
her dialysis treatment, the intravenous needle which returned
the filtered blood to her body came out of her arm. She was
unattended for a period of twenty-five minutes ... [while t]he
dialysis machine continued to pump her blood onto the floor
and walls."' When the attendants returned, she was dead.'
During the defendant's deposition, the plaintiffs tried to discover certain information communicated to the defendant by the
attendants the day after Durham died. 0 The defendant objected to these questions, arguing that the information was sought
for purposes of impeachment because the plaintiffs had admitted during the deposition that they might use the information
for impeachment purposes.7 The court rejected this argument,

61. See State ex rel. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Bentley, 752
S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding); State ex rel. Department
of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Sullivan, 722 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.-Housten
[14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
62. 673 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, orig. proceeding).
63. I& at 294-95.
64. For example, the trial judge in Walker v. Packer, who sits in Dallas, denied
discovery of evidence sought for impeachment believing that she was required to do
so by RusselL 827 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding).
65. 687 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1985, orig. proceeding).
66. Id. at 442.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 443.
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holding that when information is sought for other purposes in
addition to impeachment, the information is discoverable.7 2
The Texas Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify
the meaning of Russell. In Walker v. Packer,73 a medical malpractice case, the court characterized Russell as dealing with
"wholesale discovery of financial records of a potential medical
expert witness who was not a party to the lawsuit."74 The
plaintiffs in Walker requested documents to impeach one of the
defendant's expert witnesses, a faculty member in obstetrics at
the University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas
(UTHSC). 75 The doctor "testified at his deposition that expert
witness fees earned by obstetrics faculty members are deposited
into a 'fund,'" and "that obstetrics faculty members [are] paid
'indirectly from this fund.'" 76 He further testified "that he was
unaware of any obstetrics department policy restricting faculty
members from testifying for plaintiffs in medical malpractice
cases." 77 Later, in an unrelated lawsuit, another obstetrics faculty member testified that the department's official written
policy "requires a doctor to obtain authorization from other
faculty members before testifying for any plaintiff in a medical
malpractice suit."7 8 Based on this information, the plaintiffs in
Walker sought to depose the manager of the fund and to obtain
79
documents reflecting the policy.
The trial judge believed that the information "'would be
relevant to this cause of action!" but denied discovery based on
her understanding of Russell.' The Texas Supreme Court,
however, distinguished the situation in Walker on the basis
that the Walkers sought a narrow and specific kind of information and had shown a specific need for the information while
the discovery disapproved in Russell was impermissibly "global."8 ' It may be that the supreme court merely applied the
usual relevance rules to impeachment evidence: the trial court
should balance the importance of the information sought
against the burden of producing the information."
This
standard would be an appropriate one. However, Walker cannot

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

I&
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 837.
Id-

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id
Id. at 838.

81.

Id.
Id.
Id.

82.

Refer to notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
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be seen as a ringing endorsement of the discoverability of impeachment evidence. First, the court distinguished rather that
overruled Russell. Second, the court suggested that if the doctor
changes his deposition testimony and admits the existence and
details of the UTHSC policy ("'unequivocally admits [his] bias
or interest!"), the information requested would no longer be
relevant either to show bias s3or to show that his original deposition testimony was untrue.
5. Physical and mental examinations. In most types of
discovery, information is discoverable if it is "relevant." When
the party seeks to compel a physical or mental examination
under Rule 167a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the party also must show that the party's condition is "in
controversy" and that there is "good cause" to allow the examination s 4 Texas courts have generally been much more hesitant to find good cause than they have been to find relevance,
in part because of the history of the physical and mental examination provisions in the Texas discovery rules. When the Texas
Supreme Court first adopted the rules of civil procedure, the
court expressly rejected compelled examinations as too severe
an intrusion on personal privacy.' Although these provisions
were incorporated into the rules in 1973, Texas courts have
historically viewed the provisions with suspicion and accordingly interpreted them fairly strictly.3
In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court decided Coates v.
Whittington7 a case interpreting Rule 167a. In the underlying
lawsuit, plaintiff Myrna Coates sued Drackett Products when
she was injured while using Drackett's oven cleaner. s Coates
sought damages for both physical injuries and mental anguish.' Drackett moved for an order compelling Coates to
submit to a mental examination based on Drackett's contention
that Coates' mental anguish was a pre-existing condition and
may have motivated her to injure herself with the oven clean-

83. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 nn.5-6 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. EVYD. 613(b)).
84. TEx. &. Civ. P. 167a(a).
85. Documents on file with authors.
86. See e.g., C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.WM 228, 231-32
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ rerd n-r.e.) (asserting that Rule
167a(a) does not grant an absolute right and falls within the ambit of judicial discretion).
87. 758 S.W.2d 749 ('ex. 1988, orig. proceeding).
88. Id. at 750.
89. Id.
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er. The supreme court rejected Drackett's argument that a
mental examination was proper.9 '
First, the court rejected Drackett's argument that by requesting damages for mental anguish Coates had put her mental condition "in controversy":
To permit Drackett to compel a mental examination because
Mrs. Coates has claimed mental anguish damages would open
the door to involuntary mental examinations in virtually every
personal injury suit. Rule 167a was not intended to authorize
sweeping probes into a plaintiff's psychological past simply
because the plaintiff has been injured and seeks damages for
mental .anguish as a result of the injury. Plaintiffs should not
be subjected to public revelations of the most personal aspects
of their private lives just because they seek
compensation for
92
mental anguish associated with an injury.
Neither Coates' claim for mental anguish nor Drackett's contributory negligence claim placed Coates' mental state in controversy so as to justify a mental examination.'
Second, the court determined that there was not "good
cause" to order the examination.' The court explained that
the requirement of good cause for a compulsory mental examination may be satisfied only when three elements are proved
by the discovering party. 95 First, the examination must be
"relevant to issues that are genuinely in controversy in the
case," and the requested examination must be "likely to lead to
: , . evidence of relevance to the case."' Second, the discovering party "must show a reasonable nexus between the condition
in controversy and the examination sought." 97 The court found
that Drackett had failed to make either of these relevance-

90. Id
91. Id. at 752-53. The court also held that, because Rule 167a requires that a
mental examination be conducted by a "physician," a psychologist may not conduct a
compulsory mental examination under the rule. Id. at 751. As amended, effective
September 1, 1990, Rule 167a changes this result by adding licensed psychologists to
the list of persons authorized to conduct a court-ordered examination in non-family
law cases when the party responding to the motion has identified a psychologist as
an expert who will testify. TEx. R CIv. P. 167a(a),(d)-(e). In addition, in Moore v.
Wood, 809 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding), the
court held that a person could not be compelled, under Rule 167a, to submit to an
examination by a "vocational rehabilitation specialist." Id. at 623-24.
92. Coates, 758 S.W.2d at 752.
93. Id
94. Id at 752-53.
95. Id. at 753.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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based showings.' Third, the discovering party must show that
it is not possible to obtain the desired information by any other
less intrusive mean s. 9 Drackett likewise failed to meet this
test.10
The supreme court also explained that circumstances may
exist under which a mental examination could be ordered. If,
for example, "a plaintiff intends to use expert medical testimony to prove his or her alleged mental condition, that condition
is placed in controversy and the defendant would [therefore]
have good cause for an examination under Rule 167a." 0 1
When fairness clearly requires an examination, courts have
allowed it. In two cases decided after Coates, Sherwood Lane
Associates v. O'Neill"° and Exxon Corp. v. Starr," mandamus was granted to compel an independent examination by a
psychiatrist of the defendants' choice on the grounds that the
examination was permissible under Coates."°4 In Sherwood
Lane, the underlying lawsuit involved a premises liability action arising from an alleged sexual assault in a vacant unit of
an apartment complex. Two psychologists, designated by the
plaintiff as expert witnesses, had treated the plaintiff and had
admitted her to a psychiatric hospital."° In determining that
the trial court's denial of an independent examination constituted an abuse of discretion, the court of appeals stated:
The minor has already been examined by her expert witnesses. Unless relators are allowed the requested relief, their
expert's analysis will be limited to a review of the minor's
'records and the testimony of the minor's psychologists.
Relators' expert would be precluded from examining matters
not covered by the minor's psychologists' examinations and
would be precluded from making his own observations. The
trial court's action severely restricts relators' opportunity to
discover facts that may contradict the opinions of the minor's
expert witnesses. In turn, such restriction severely limits
to contest the minor's claim for mental injury
relators' ability
1 6
damages. 0

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
782 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
790 S.W.2d 883 CTex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 887; Sherwood Lane, 782 S.V.2d at 945.
Sherwood Lane, 782 S.W.2d at 943.
Id. at 945.
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Similarly, in Starr the plaintiff alleged that as a result of
an explosion caused by the negligence of the defendants, he had
suffered both physical injuries and severe mental injury which
required institutionalization." °7 The trial court denied the
defendant's request for a compulsory psychiatric examination."° The court of appeals held that because the
plaintiffs mental condition was "clearly in controversy" and
that the defendant showed "good cause" for the examination,
the defendant was entitled to have the plaintiff examined by a
psychiatrist of his own choosing."° "To deny such a psychiatric examination presents precisely the dangers outlined by
the . .. Court [in Sherwood Lane]; in effect it would be to deny
them a fair trial.""'
Shortly before the Coates decision, one court of appeals
upheld an order subjecting a plaintiff claiming physical injuries
to a court-ordered physical examination. In May v. Lawrence,"' plaintiff Freeland May sued Lufkin Cresoting Company (LCC) for damages based on his physical injuries arising out
of a vehicular accident involving May and an employee of
LCC." 2 The court reasoned that by asserting physical injuries, May placed his condition in controversy and provided LCC
with good cause for an examination to determine the existence
and extent of the asserted injury." 3
Two cases involving the drug testing of parents in child
custody disputes further illustrate the availability of court-ordered examinations. In Walsh v. Ferguson,"4 the court rejected such an order, finding that the wife's claims of drug use by
her husband were not sufficient to show that the husband's
mental or physical condition was in controversy or that good
cause existed for the blood and urine tests. 5 At the trial
court hearing, the wife offered no evidence to support her claim
that
her husband used
drugs." 6
In Monaghan v.
7
Crawford," however, because evidence was offered to support
the claim of drug use, the court of appeals upheld the dismissal
of an application to modify a child custody order because the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Starr, 790 S.W.2d at 884.
Id at 886.
Id. at 887.
Id at 888.
751 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding).
Id, at 679.
Id. at 678-79 (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 119 (1964)).
712 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 887.
Id.
763 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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mother filing11the
application refused to submit to court-ordered
8
drug testing.
C. The Balancing Process Revisited
Any decision that involves a balancing of interests is inherently a mushy one, and so for the most part, the question of
discovery relevance defies any attempt to draw clear lines or to
extrapolate from one case to the next. What is clear, however,
is that relevance issues can be of crucial importance to the
outcome of a case. A party denied discovery of significant information may be unable to prove a meritorious case while another party subjected to giganticdiscovery burdens may give up on
litigation because of its costs.
In weighing the burden of discovery, Texas courts seem to
consider the parties' resources. Thus, in product liability cases
against large corporate defendants, those defendants may be required to undertake significant amounts of work to comply with
discovery requests. General Motors, for example, has been compelled to produce all impact tests from 1967 to 1979 on a variety of General Motors passenger cars in a case involving a 1976
Vega hatchback" 9 and to produce test results relating to incab gas tanks with protruding cab filler necks from 1949 to
1972 in a suit concerning a 1966 Chevrolet chassis cab
truck.' ° On the other hand, individual litigants may not be
required to shoulder such a significant burden. One court, for
example, refused to order an ex-husband to produce business
records relating to his income and the property he 12
acquired
1
decree.
divorce
a
following
years
two
of
period
a
during
This kind of comparative approach can further the purpose
of open discovery. Commentators have noted that those parties
with established power in society tend to appear in court as
defendants. 1" When a lawsuit begins, those defendants usually have the bulk of relevant information without the need to do
formal discovery, while plaintiffs tend not to have such information. Unless the discovery process operates to equalize access

118. Id. at 957-58.
119. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Tex. 1984, orig. proceeding).
120. General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1983, orig.
proceeding).
121. Gordon v. Blackmon, 675 S.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984, orig. proceeding).
122. See, &g., 23 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5422, at 674; Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work
Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1564 (1991).
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to information, the result of any adversary trial process will be
twisted by the lack of full information."2
Consider, for example, a recent appellate case. In Cantrell
v. Hennessy Industries, Inc.,"2 the plaintiff was left blind and
permanently disfigured when an automobile tire exploded in his
face while he was changing the tire on a machine manufactured by the Coats Company. 1" The plaintiff argued that
Coats failed to equip the machine with a pressure-limiting device which would restrict the amount of air pressure to safe
levels and that such a device was technically feasible. 120 The
trial court, ruling on discovery objections by Coats, limited discovery to documents regarding the exact model of machine that
injured the plaintiff and excluded discovery and evidence of
other Coats tire-changing machines that had pressure-limiting
devices 12 7 Having successfully prevented discovery, Coats argued to the jury that the plaintiff had not proven that safety
devices were available or feasible, 12 and the jury found that
the machine was not defective. 1" Under current discovery
law, the trial court's unduly restrictive concept of relevance was
held to be erroneous and the case was reversed on appeal.13"
Without the availability of this kind of discovery, the product
would be just as defective as it was (or was not) before, but the
plaintiff would be unable to prove his case. A broader concept
of discovery relevance, therefore, does not undermine the adversary system but assures that it can function more accurately.
III.
A.

RULE 166B EXEMPTIONS

Overview

Texas has five specific types of exemptions from discovery
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(3). The first, work

123. As one of the architects of the federal discovery rules noted, discovery was
intended to redistribute information and to subordinate the concept of a lawsuit as a
game between opposing counsel. See Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial
Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L REV. 737, 739 (1939) (stating that "[olach
party may in effect be called upon by his adversary or by the judge to lay all his
cards upon the table, the important consideration being who has the stronger hand,
not who can play the cleverer game").

124.

829 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, n.w.h.).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

at 876.
at 876-77.
at 877.
at 878.
at 877-78.
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product of an attorney,"' is not fully defined in either the
rule or the relevant case law. The second exemption protects
pure consulting experts: experts who neither testify nor have
their work product reviewed by testifying experts."l The third
exemption protects the written statements of potential witnesses, although a separate provision allows a person to acquire
copies of her own statement."~ The fourth exemption, known
as the "party communication privilege," protects communications made in the course of investigations into events which
later give rise to legal claims or defenses."3 Finally, the fifth
exemption protects "any matter protected from disclosure by

privilege."135

This scheme of categorization creates potential overlap between the different paragraphs of Rule 166b. The Texas discovery rules separate what the federal courts call "work product" into a number of separate categories and leave the residual category named "work product" undefined. Thus, it is unclear
how the different Rule 166b exemptions relate to each other.
For example, is a witness statement taken by a lawyer a mere
witness statement or is it also work product? Can a photograph
taken by a lawyer be work product? What happens to work
product materials given to a testifying expert? Ideally, such
overlaps should be insignificant. However, another 1988 change
in the rules makes categorization very important. The last unnumbered paragraph of 166b(3) now provides:
Upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means, a party may obtain discovery of the
materials otherwise exempted from discovery by subparagraphs c [witness statements] and d [party communications] of
this paragraph 3."
This paragraph creates an escape hatch for the witness statement and party communication exemptions, but provides no
such escape for work product, expert information, or privilege
Parties seeking discovery will therefore try to
exemptions.'

131.

Tax. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(a). For a general discussion of the Rule 166b privi-

leges, see WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, 3A TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 89A.03 (1992).

132. Id. 166b(3)(b); see also id. 166b(2)(e) (allowing discovery of a consulting
expert's opinions and bases for them when the testifying expert is relying on them).
133. Id. 166b(3)(c).
134. Id. 166b(3)(d).
135. Id. 166b(3)(e).
136. Id 166b(3).
137. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. 1991,
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characterize potentially exempt information as a party communication or a witness statement, whereas parties resisting discovery will try to shield information with claims of work product, expert status, or privilege. The result is a large potential
for litigation.
B. Attorney's Work Product
1. What is work product? When the Texas discovery rules
were promulgated in 1940, the rules contained an exemption
for trial preparation materials that basically corresponded with
what is now the party communication exemption."8 In 1957,
the rules added the now-defunct "investigative information"
exemption. 139 The investigative information exemption protected from discovery all information learned during the course of
trial preparation. The existence of this exemption so thoroughly
protected all trial preparation materials that there was no need
to distinguish among the various possible types of exempt information or to invoke any other privilege. Although the "work
product" language was added to the rules in 1973,140 the provisions were rarely treated separately. Most Texas cases applied
the investigative information exemption instead of applying the
undefined work product exemption.
As long as the investigative information exemption existed,
it stood as a major roadblock to an evenhanded sharing of information. The exemption even protected the names of witnesses and potential parties.1 ' While the 1971 amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure specifically permitted discovery of the identity and location of potential witnesses and parties,'4 2 the investigative information exemption continued to
have a very broad effect and the work product privilege continued to be largely ignored. 143

orig. proceeding) (holding that the substantial need exception does not apply to work
product); Riggs v. Sentry Ins., 821 S.W.2d 701, 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (asserting that there is no compelling need exception to, work
product).

138.
139.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 167, 3 Tgx. B.J. 548-49 (1940).
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a, 20 TEx. B.J. 189 (1957).
140.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a, 35 TEX. B.J. 1042 (1972).
141. See Ex parte Hanlon, 406 S.W.2d 204, 206-08 (Tex. 1966) (reversing the trial
court's contempt order for failing to divulge the name of a potential party); Ex parte
Laden, 160 Tex. 7, 10-11, 325 S.W.2d 121, 124 (1959) (reversing the trial court's
contempt order against an attorney who refused to divulge the names of witnesses).
142. Tex. R. Civ. P. 167, 33 TEX. B.J. 708-09 (1970).
143. See James B. Sales, Pretrial Discovery in Texas Under the Amended Rules:
Analysis and Commentary, 27 S. Tgx. L. REv. 305, 315 (1986) (explaining that the
work product exemption was often merged with the party communication exemption).
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In 1984, the rule drafters eliminated the investigative information exemption and tried to distinguish among the remaining exemptions.' The work product exemption was not
defined, nor was it defined in the 1988 or 1990 amendments to
Rule 166b. However, the 1984 changes (1) made the remaining
exemptions and their relationship to each other more important
and (2) gave these exemptions separate paragraphs in an effort
to clarify the parameters of each.145 The amendments that
went into effect in 1988 and 1990 attempted to further define
each exemption.'4 6
Much of the early case law is unclear on the scope of the
work product exemption. The key issue is whether "work product" includes only attorney opinion work product-those materials which show the lawyer's mental impressions, personal beliefs, and litigation strategy--or if it also includes ordinary
work product-any work produced by the lawyer or his agents
regardless of whether it discloses counsel's mental impressions
and opinions. The Texas Supreme Court has characterized
notes, lists, and memoranda prepared by an attorney as "work
product in every sense of the term."14 7 The meaning of this
reference is unclear, however, because we do not know the nature of the notes, lists, and memoranda to which the court
referred. Some courts have expressed the broader viewpoint
that while the work product exemption "is not an umbrella for
materials gathered in the ordinary course of the lawyer's business,"1 the exemption "protects from disclosure specific documents, reports, communications, memoranda, mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories prepared and assembled in actual anticipation of litigation or for trial."""
More recent cases seem to focus more narrowly on the
attorney's mental impressions."'s For example, in Leede Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. McCorkle,"5 ' the court of appeals held that the

144.

In the 1984 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the exemp-

tions from discovery were moved from former Rule 186a to Rule 166b(3). Tex. R.
Civ. P. 166b(3), 47 TEx. B.J. 10 (Special Pull-out Section Feb. 1984).
145. Id.
146. See Tex. R Civ. P. 166b(3), 53 TEX. BJ. 597 (1990); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166b(3),
50 TIEx. B.J. 857 (1987).
147. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987, orig. proceeding).
148. Evans v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 685 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
149. Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc. v. Moore, 731 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding).
150. See, eg., Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. 1990, orig.
proceeding) (noting that attorney work product privilege protects 'only the mental
impressions, opinions, and conclusions of the lawyer and not the facts").
151. 789 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
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trial court had properly ordered the production of selected portions of notes taken at conferences with a deceased fact and
expert witness which had been prepared by the plaintiffs attorneys. 5 2 The court stated:
The portions of the notes under consideration are neutral recitals of facts; they contain no commentary. They do not show
how Leede will use the facts, if at all. They do not remotely
suggest Leede's trial strategy. They do not give a clue as to
the lawyer's reaction to the testimony. The most that can be
said is that the lawyer thought these facts important enough
to [be] put in writing. The mere fact that lawyer effort has
gone into obtaining the material does not make it work prod1
uct. 5

In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Banales,'" the
court of appeals held that a videotape of a practice deposition
was not per se work product.'55 However, the court noted that
the videotape could contain information which could be classified as work product and, therefore, held that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to review the videotape in camera before compelling discovery.
It was incumbent upon the trial court to examine the contents
of the video to discern whether it contained strategy, evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the case or mental
impressions which would be protected. Likewise, the trial
court should view the videotape to determine whether it contained information tending to mold the witness' testimony,
which would not be worthy of protection.'6
Similarly, in Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany67 the court of appeals
held that photographs taken by a lawyer were not "work prod-

152. Id. at 687.
153. Id. The Texas Supreme Court recently cited Leede with approval in OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 750 n.2 (Tex. 1991, orig. pro.
ceeding). The court repeated in Owens-Corning that the work product immunity is
intended to "shelter the mental processes, conclusions, and legal theories of the attorney" and also commented that "the protection granted under the work product
doctrine does not extend to facts the attorney may acquire." Id. at 750 & n.2. On
the other hand, Owens-Corning involved "work product' protection for 11,000 pages
of documents. Id. at 749. Could all of the documents be pure opinion work product?
Maybe, with 90,000 asbestos cases pending against Owens-Corning, they could be
solely strategic in nature. See id. at 751 n.3. Perhaps, however, the supreme court
just was not focusing on this issue because it was unnecessary for purposes of the
holding in the case.
154. 773 S.W.2d 693 ('ex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, orig. proceeding).
155. Id. at 694.
156. Id.
157. 755 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proceeding), overruled in
part, 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding).
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uct" unless they reflected the mental
impressions, opinions, or
s
legal theories of the attorney.'1
The recent decision in Owens v. Wallacer 9 deals with the
issue of intangible work product. In Owens the defendant had
sent interrogatories to the plaintiffs asking the plaintiffs to
"'state each and every fact upon which [they] intend[ed] to rely'
in proving various allegations in their petition."" The plaintiffs objected on the basis that answering these interrogatories
would reveal their attorney's trial strategy. 1 ' The appellate
court disagreed: "The information sought, the facts underlying
the lawsuit, is clearly discoverable ....
That the interrogatories asked what facts the plaintiffs intend to rely upon,
does
2
not change the discoverable nature of the information."6
The Owens court may have missed the point of the work
product argument. The work product objection was based on
the interrogatories' inquiry into opposing counsel's "reliance" on
certain facts rather than about the revelation of all the relevant
"facts." The potential problem with the interrogatories is that
they ask on what facts the plaintiffs will "rely." Had the interrogatories asked for a summary of the expected trial testimony
of plaintiffs' witnesses, the basis for the work product objection
would have been clearer. From a policy standpoint, however,
the result in Owens was probably correct. Now that pretrial
orders can require things such as written statements of the
parties' contentions, lists of fact and expert witnesses and summaries of their testimony, and the exchange of trial exhibits,"s the revelation of this kind of information has become
more an issue of timing than of privilege, a question of when
this information should be revealed rather than whether it
should be revealed." 4 The information should clearly be provided to opposing counsel at some point; trial courts need some
discretion to decide when such disclosure is appropriate in each
case.

158.
159.

Id at 173.
821 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).

160.

Id at 747.

161.
Id.
162. Id. at 748. Cf. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Schild, 828 S.W2d
502, 503-04 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding) (holding that an interroga-

tory requesting the defendant to "[p]roduce a description and/or photograph of each
and every exhibit that you may introduce as evidence at trial" is a request for work
product).
163.
See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166(d), (h), (i), (1).
164.
Thornburg, supra note 122, at 1574. Allowing this kind of discovery also
makes Texas law consistent with federal law. See icL at 1668-69 n.236.
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The dilemma will be a recurring one. There are a number
of consequences of the courts' interpretation of the work product and other discovery exemptions. Some information is discoverable and some is not. Some of the Rule 166b exemptions are
subject to a substantial need/undue hardship override and some
are not, as in federal court, "ordinary work product" is subject
to override while "opinion work product" is not.6 5
2. What are the time parameters of work product? At least
until recently, Texas has taken a case-specific approach to work
product. It therefore becomes crucial to determine when work
product protection begins and when it ends. The exemption begins when the particular litigation begins or when the party
has good cause to believe a suit will be filed. 1" The occurrence of the accident itself does not automatically create good
cause to anticipate litigation.16 7 In the context of party communications, the Texas Supreme Court applied a two-part
test' 8s for determining when good cause exists in the context
of party communications:
The first prong requires an objective examination of the facts
surrounding the investigation. Consideration should be given
to outward manifestations which indicate litigation is immi-

165.
In federal court "ordinary work product" is generally subject to override
though some courts have held that "opinion work product" is exempt from discovery.
See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733-36 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); see also In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Utig.,
859 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that some federal courts have hold
that the protection for some opinion work product is "ironclad"); D.M.M., Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA.
L. REV. 333, 337 (1978) (noting that "[s]everal courts have held that opinion work
product is immune without exception from discovery"). Opinion work product includes
"an attorney's strategy, including his intended lines of proof and cross-examination
plans. 'Opinion work product' also encompasses an attorney's evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of his case and the inferences he has drawn from interviews of witnesses." D.M.M., supra, at 337 (footnotes omitted). Ordinary work product includes work product that does not disclose such attorney thought processes.
See Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 791 n.196
(1983) (citing Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)).
166.
See Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Davis, 775
S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (stating
that good cause requires proof of both objective evidence and a subjective good faith
belief that suit would be filed); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Heard, 774
S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding [leave de.
nied]) (reviewing the anticipation of litigation standards used by the courts and stat.
ing that the trial court must ultimately make a judgment call).
167.
Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986, orig.
proceeding).
168.
Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38 ('ex. 1989, orig. proceed.
ing).
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nent. The second prong utilizes a subjective approach. Did the
party opposing discovery have a good faith belief that litigation would ensue? There cannot be good cause to believe a
suit will be filed unless elements of both prongs are present.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
investigation, the trial court must then determine if the investigation was done in anticipation of litigation.'0
A few recent appellate cases have applied this test to attorney work product. In Texas Department of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation v. Davis,' "a severely retarded quadriplegic adult drowned in a whirlpool bath at Travis State
School."' Within hours of the death, W. Kent Johnson, Director of Legal Services for the Texas Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR), ordered an investigation of the incident. 2 School and TDMHMR employees
conducted tape-recorded interviews of several employees on the
days immediately following the death and compiled a report to
Johnson shortly thereafter.'7 3 TDMHMR did not receive a
claim from the dead man's parents until twenty days after his
death, and suit was filed twelve days later. 74 During discovery, the plaintiffs sought production of "'any notes, reports,
memoranda, or other documents,' pertaining to the occurrence
[that were] 'obtained by [TDMHMR] through its employees'
after the death, but before [TDMHMR] received notice of the
[parents] claim."7 5 TDMHMR resisted producing the taperecorded interviews and the report, relying on the work product
exemption."7 The trial court found that the material was not
protected, and the court of appeals agreed.7
Johnson, the TDMHMR lawyer, submitted an affidavit constituting the only evidence to support the claim that the investigation was done in anticipation of litigation. 7 8 Johnson stated that "'[w]hen the circumstances of Mr. Espinoza's death
were explained to me, I formed the opinion that there was significant potential for litigation against the State and its employees . . . [and] [flor that reason I immediately requested that

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 41.
775 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id
Id.

175.

Id.

176.

1d.

177.
178.

Id. at 469, 474-75.
Id. at 472.
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an investigation be conducted.'" 171 Johnson further stated, "'I
make requests of this sort only when I am convinced that litigation will ultimately be filed.'""
The court rejected this argument. 18 1 First, Johnson's
statement was found to imply that he "routinely" requests an
investigation in certain circumstances. 18 2 Second, at the time
Johnson requested the investigation, the parents had not
indicated that they intended to sue." Therefore, considering
"the totality of the circumstances," the court held that the trial
court could reasonably have found that the facts failed to show
a reasonable anticipation of litigation,
thus making the work
4
product exemption inapplicable.'8
A few months earlier, the same court of appeals found that
the facts proved did show reasonable anticipation of litigation
in the work product context. In Wiley v. Williams,'85 the underlying lawsuit arose from the collapse of a bay in a building
under construction that resulted in injuries to several workers."s On the morning that the construction bay collapsed,
the defendant called its lawyer, informed the lawyer that a
serious accident had occurred, and asked the lawyer to represent the defendant in connection with any legal problems that
might arise from the accident.'87 The lawyer then hired an investigator."s The plaintiffs sought to discover the handwritten
notes of the lawyer's conversations with the investigator and
transcriptions of statements recorded by the investigator.' 89
At a hearing on a motion to compel discovery, the lawyer
testified that the existence of a general contractor and two
subcontractors with indemnification clauses would make the
claim difficult to settle."9 He further testified that "he concluded at the time that he was hired it was extremely likely
there would be litigation stemming from the accident."19 ' In

179.

Id

180. Id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Indeed, as the court notes, the parents may not even have been informed of the death at the time the investigation began. Id.
184. I& Although the court of appeals referred to the material at issue in this
case as "work product," it is probably more accurately described as a combination of
party communications and witness statements.
185. 769 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
186. Id. at 716.
187. Id. at 718.
188. Id.
189. Id190. See id191. Id
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this case, the trial judge concluded that the information was
protected by the work product doctrine. The court of appeals
then refused to disturb that finding in a mandamus
proceeding." Because this case is pre-Flores, the holding is
suspect for its lack of an "objective, outside manifestation of litigation" requirement.'9 However, the Davis court cited Wiley
without
disavowing it, so Wiley may have some remaining vital4
19

ity.

Importantly, however, the Texas Supreme Court has not
yet specifically decided whether the same "anticipation of litigation" rules that apply to party communications apply to work
product. The language of the rules themselves does not require
a symmetrical result. The party communication and witness
statement exemptions specifically require the protected material
to have been made "subsequent to the occurrence or transaction
upon which the suit is based and in connection with the prosecution, investigation, or defense of the particular suit, or in
anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the claims made a
part of the pending litigation."'9 5 The work product exemption, on the other hand, is not even defined, much less provided
with time parameters. The court could, if it chose to do so, use
a different or more flexible test for "anticipation of litigation" in
cases involving work product, especially if it clearly defines
work product as including only opinion work product.
At the other end of the time spectrum, the Texas Supreme
Court has recently ruled that work product immunity does not
end when the lawsuit ends. In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
v. Caldwell," the court held that work product protection is

192. 1&
193. Refer to notes 14849 supra and accompanying text.
194. See Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Davis, 775
S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding). For other cases applying
the 'anticipation of litigation" test to work product, see Star-Telegram, Inc. v.
Schattman, 784 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 1990, orig. proceeding)
(holding that handwritten notes made by an attorney for the defendant's corporate
parent were discoverable because the notes were made not in anticipation of litigation but to give advice regarding corrective measures to ensure compliance with
federal employment law); Boring & Tunneling Co. of Am., Inc. v. Salazar, 782
S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (rejecting
past experience and deviation from usual custom as a basis for anticipation of litigation because they were solely subjective in nature); Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 755
S.W.2d 170, 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proceeding) (refusing to hold that
documents prepared for an investigation were made in anticipation of litigation when
the investigation was separate from the impending lawsuit), oterrulcd in part, 798
S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding).
195. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(c)-(d).
196. 818 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding).
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of 'continuing duration. " 197 In that case, Owens-Coming was
sued in two asbestos personal injury actions.19 It produced
35,700 pages of documents and asserted privilege for 11,000
pages of documents." One of the asserted privileges was
work productY After a special master reviewed the documents in camera, the trial court held that only one page was
protected by work product because the other documents had
been prepared in anticipation of different lawsuits. 20 ' The
Texas Supreme Court, however, held that the "underlying purpose would be totally defeated if the work product privilege
were limited to documents that were
prepared in the particular
2°
case for which discovery is sought."
Whether the reasoning of Owens-Corning also undermines
case-specific analysis of the starting point of the work product
immunity remains to be seen. The supreme court stated that
"any party which is a repeat litigant clearly must be allowed to
develop an overall legal strategy for all the cases in which it is
involved." ° Consistent with this reasoning, the court could
continue to require that before information becomes work product in the first place, the attorney must have been contemplating specific litigation. In the alternative, the court could apply
its policy views more broadly and find that a party contemplating the potential of multiple lawsuits does not have to be "anticipating" any particular one when creating work product. As
noted above, the language of the discovery exemptions leaves
°4
the court leeway to choose either course.

197.

Id at 751-52.

198.

Id-at 749.

199.
200.
'201.

Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 750.
Id.

202.

Id. The court of appeals, in Wood v. McCown, 784 S.W.2d

124 ('ex.

App.-Austin 1990, orig. proceeding), had earlier held that the work product exemption does not terminate at the end of a criminal case when an attorney's trial notes,
witness interview notes, and personal notes reflecting legal research for the accused's
defense are sought in a subsequent civil case. Id. at 129. The court's reasoning,
however, is potentially applicable to both civil and criminal cases:
In both the criminal and civil contexts, the potential chilling effect upon an
attorney's willingness to record and retain his mental impressions, factual
investigations, or legal research is considerable when a lawyer knows that
his work product will be subject to discovery after the conclusion of his
client's case.

Id203.

Owens-Corning, 818 S.W.2d at 751 (footnote omitted).

204. Note also that the Texas Supreme Court in Owens-Corning shows that it Is
aware of the differences among the different Rule 166b exemptions. Id. at 751.
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3. Whose work can be work product? Another undefined
element of work product involves identifying the parties whose

work can constitute work product. Specifically, it is not always
clear whether work done by the agents of an attorney can receive work product protection. At the federal level, materials
prepared by an attorney's agents in anticipation of litigation
are entitled to a qualified immunity from discovery:
[The doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the
realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those
realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of
investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials
in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as
well as those prepared by the attorney himself.'

Texas courts have agreed with this conclusion in principle.
For example, in Bearden v. Boone'° the court of appeals
found that the work product doctrine protected information
gathered by an investigator hired by an attorney.' More recently, in Wiley v. Williams' the court of appeals held that
the "work product doctrine protects materials prepared by

agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself."'
Difficult problems arise, however, when the attorney's
agent acts not only for the attorney but also for others. In

Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc. v. Moore,21° the court of appeals
rejected an attempt to cloak investigations in work product
protection.2 ' The plaintiff in the underlying action sued his

employer for exemplary damages on the basis of gross negligence allegations.2 1 2 A claims examiner who had been working for the worker's compensation carrier had interviewed various witnesses and turned transcripts of the interviews over to
the employer's attorney. 3 The employer claimed that these
transcripts were work product and argued that the investigator
"wore two hats," one as claims investigator for the compensation carrier and another in his role as the agent of the

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975).
693 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, orig. proceeding).
I& at 28.
769 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding leave denied)).
Id. at 717.
731 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding).
See id. at 140.
See id. at 138.
Id.
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employer's attorney conducting a separate gross negligence investigation.2 14 The court rejected the work product claim, finding that the interviews had been prepared in the ordinary
course of investigating the compensation claim and that the
was at all times the agent of the insurance cominvestigator
21
pany. 5
4. Summary. The parameters of the work product exemption from discovery continue to be a muddle for the Texas
courts. Part of the confusion stems from the old investigative
information exemption. 216 Because this exemption protected
both communications and underlying facts, Texas lawyers did
not develop the habit of distinguishing between a communication and the content of the communication, between the container and the thing contained. Current law, however, requires
such thinking. Assume, for example, that a lawyer wrote a
memo stating, "I plan to call Mr. Smith as a witness at trial to
testify that the light was green." The work product exemption
would protect that memo as it embodies the lawyer's trial strategy, and the opponent could not secure a copy of it by sending
a document production request asking for a copy of the memo.
However, should the opponent send an interrogatory asking the
color of the light, the question could not be avoided on the
ground that it would reveal work product.
While only one of the authors of this article has argued for
the abolition of the work product exemption as we now know
it, 217 we both agree that if there is to be a work product exemption, it should be narrowly construed. The best solution
under the current Texas scheme would be to include only pure
opinion work product-attorney mental impressions and trial
strategy-as "work product." Thus, the purely strategic materials most arguably necessary for the operation of an adversary
trial would be protected while a more even-handed sharing of
factual information relevant to the dispute between the parties
would be available. This solution, if accompanied by a sensible,
non-paranoid attitude about what can be discerned about strat-

214. See icL at 139.
215. See id. at 139-40.
216. Rule 186a protected "information obtained in the course of an investigation
of a claim or defense by a person employed to make such investigation." Tex. R.
Civ. P. 186a, 20 Tgx. B.J. 189 (1957). It was thus much more protective of parties
resisting discovery than the federal approach embodied by Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947), in which the Supreme Court noted that the attorney client privilege
and work product exemption protect communications but not the underlying information itself. Id, at 508.
217. See Thornburg, supra note 122, passim.
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egy from reading an essentially factual document, might also
reduce the cost to the judicial system of the constant demands
for in camera inspection of documents on the ground that they
somehow reveal the attorney's thought processes. 1
Having adopted a narrow definition of work product immunity, the courts could be more flexible as to its time parameters. Because the courts would be protecting strategic decisions
and trial plans, not information, the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement need not be so case specific. Rather, consistent
with Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. u. Caldwell,211 the court
could protect the pure opinion work product that allowed the
attorney to develop strategy for a series of interrelated cases.
C. Consulting Experts
Any party may discover by interrogatory the names and
addresses of all experts expected to be called as witnesses at
trial by the other party, as well as the subject matter of each
witness' testimony.' A party may also discover the identity,
location, mental impressions, and opinions of non-testifying experts whose work has been reviewed by testifying experts. 2 1
The identity of persons designated as pure consulting experts,
on the otherhand, is outside the scope of discovery.22 The
party claiming privilege must establish that the consulting expert was retained in anticipation of litigation.2
Moreover,
Rule 166b makes clear that none of the exemptions listed in
paragraph 3 of the rule are to be construed to render non-discoverable the identity and location of any expert expected to
testify or any consulting expert whose opinions or impressions
have been reviewed by a testifying expert.2 4

218. For a discussion of the cost to the litigants and to society resulting from
work product immunity, see id at 1550-73.
219. 818 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding).
220. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e), 168; Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.
1979, orig. proceeding).
221. TEx. I. Civ. P. 166b(3)Xb). Earlier versions of the exemption had made nontestifying experts' material discoverable only if the testifying experts relied on their
work. Tex. I. Civ. P. 166b(3)Cb), 50 TEX. BJ. 857 (1987) (stating that non.testifying
experts' opinions 'are discoverable if the expert's work product forms a basis either
in whole or in part of the opinions of an expert who will be called as a witness').
The change making material discoverable only if 'reviewed' was intended to limit
evasions and quibbles about when an expert has actually 'relied* on another expert's
work.
222. TEx. P. Civ. P. 166b(3)Xb); Werner, 579 S.W.2d at 456.
223. Owens v. Wallace, 821 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).
224. TEX. I. Civ. P. 166b(3).
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The relationship between the expert witness exemption and
other discovery exemptions has also created some dilemmas for
the courts. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Blackmon,=
the court of appeals tried to sort out the overlap between the
Rule 166b exemptions and the discoverability of information
relied on by testifying experts. Aetna had designated an employee as a testifying expert on Aetna's internal procedures and
its conduct in an underlying lawsuit."6 The plaintiffs noticed
the employee/expert's deposition, seeking documents on which
the employee/expert relied. 7 Ordinarily the materials relied
on by a testifying expert are discoverable.' However, absent
the employee's expert status, some of the documents would
have been protected by the work product, party communication,
or attorney-client privileges.2z While unwilling to hold that
Aetna waived its privileges as to any document in the expert's
possession, the court did hold that Aetna waived any privilege
it might have had for documents on which the expert would relyY The court thus properly dispatched a strategy that
would have limited a party's ability to adequately depose an
expert witness when that witness was prepared to testify using
otherwise privileged materials.
Because the discoverability of expert information depends
on categorizing the expert, disputes arise over attempts to move
experts from one category to another. There are limits on the
ability of parties to redesignate experts whose work was originally discoverable as consulting-only experts. A redesignation
may be deemed invalid if its real purpose is to defeat the legitimate objectives of discovery. In Tom L. Scott, Inc. v.
McIlhany,"' the Texas Supreme Court explained that because
the consulting expert privilege is intended as a shield to prevent a litigant from taking undue advantage of an opponent's
industry and effort and not a sword to be used to defeat proper
discovery, a redesignation pursuant to a settlement that is
made primarily to gain control of damaging expert testimony is
against public policy and invalid. 2 A court of appeals

225.

810 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding).

226. Id-at 439.
227. I&
228. TEX. IL Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(2); Aetna, 810 S.W.2d. at 440.
229. TEX. &. Civ. EvID. 503; Aetna, 810 S.W.2d at 440.
230. Id.
231. 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding).
232. Id. at 559-60. The court also stated: '"[i]f we were to hold otherwise, nothing would preclude a party in a multi-party case from in effect auctioning off a
witness' testimony to the highest bidder.'" Id. at 560 (quoting Williamson v. Superior Court, 582 P.2d 126, 132 (Cal. 1978)).
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reached the same result in a case in which redesignation of the
expert was not a condition of a settlement agreement. 21
The Texas Supreme Court has also limited a party's ability
to designate employees as consulting experts and to use the
consulting expert privilege to suppress factual information by
designating someone as a dual-capacity witness.' The court
discussed the proper treatment of these witnesses in Axelson4
Inc. v. McIlhanyY s The court first held that a dual-capacity
witness' factual knowledge that was acquired by being a factual
participant in the events material to the lawsuit is discoverable
and that this information is not protected from discovery by
changing the designation of a person with knowledge of relevant facts to a pure consulting expert.' The court reasoned
that the consulting expert exemption protects only the identity,
mental impressions and opinions of consulting experts, not their
firsthand factual knowledge.'
The court also addressed whether an employee of a party
can be designated as a consulting-only expert and stated:
Under this rule, a consulting-only expert must be informally
consulted or retained or specially employed in anticipation of
litigation. An employee who was employed in an area that
becomes the subject of litigation can never qualify as a consulting-only expert because the employment was not in anticipation of litigation. On the other hand, an employee who was
not employed in an area that becomes the subject of litigation
and is reassigned specifically to assist the employer in anticipation of litigation arising out of the incident or in preparation for trial may qualify as a "consulting-only" expert. In any
event, a party may discover facts known by an employee acting as a "consulting-only" expert.'
This limitation on the use of employees as consulting experts
needs further development. For example, courts must decide
when employees have worked in the same "area" as the subject
of litigation, whether the limitation applies to former employees, and whether the same limitation applies to workers who

233.

See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Stone, 814 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding) (holding that a consulting expert originally hired
by another party as a testifying expert in a companion case is subject to full discov-

ery by the original party).
234. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding).
A dual-capacity witness is a witness who possesses first-hand knowledge of relevant
facts and who also serves as consulting-only expert for a party. Id.
235.
798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990).

236.
237.

Id.
Id.

238.

Id. at 555.

HOUSTON LAW REWEW

278

[Vol. 29:2

are technically "independent contractors." The court should
resolve these continuing issues consistent with the policy behind Axelson of denying a party the ability to hide relevant
information behind the expert witness exemption.

D. Party Communications
Rule 166b(3)(d) defines the party communications exemption, which protects from discovery
[c]ommunications between agents or representatives or the
employees of a party to the action or communications between
a party and that party's agents, representatives or employees,
when made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon
which the suit is based and in connection with the prosecution, investigation or defense of the particular suit, or in anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the claims made a
part of the pending litigation. This exemption does not include
communications prepared by or for experts that are otherwise
discoverable. For the purpose of this paragraph, a photograph
is not a communication.
The party communications exemption is clearly case specific.'
The exemption applies only if the communication in
question was made in anticipation of the prosecution or defense
of the claim made part of the pending litigation.241 Thus,
when a person actually made the communication in question,
he or she must have been thinking about the particular lawsuit
in which the exemption would later be asserted.2 42
For example, in Eddington v. Touchy," arising from a
suit by an attorney against an insurance company for tortious
interference with his contingency contract with his client, the
court granted mandamus relief from the trial court's protective
order denying a request for production of documents relating to
the insurance company's investigation and settlement of a personal injury claim.2 Because the insurer did not show that
the investigative file for the prior claim was prepared in an-

ticipation of the suit for tortious interference, the documents
did not fall within the party communications exemption of Rule
166b(3)(d) and were not privileged in the separate cause of
239. TEx. IL Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
240. William V. Dorsaneo III, Work Product & Privilege: How to Protect It, How
to Discover It, ADVOCATE, Oct. 1988, at 27, 30.
241. Id242. Id
243.

793 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding [leave

denied]).
244.

Id. at 337.
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action. 5 The court pointed out that "[n]one of the investigative privileges protect documents from
discovery in litigation
248
separate from the 'pending litigation.'
As with the work product exemption, the most difficult
problems in determining whether information is protected as a
party communication center on the duration of the exemption.
When does a party anticipate litigation sufficiently to invoke
the exemption, and when does it end? The Texas Supreme
Court addressed the first problem in Flores u. Fourth Court of
Appeals.'7 In Flores, the court had to decide whether an investigative report, prepared after notice of injury was filed with
the Industrial Accident Board but before an appeal to a district
court, was prepared "in anticipation of litigation" so as to be
exempt from discovery in the worker's compensation case in
district court.'
To determine whether the report was protected as a party
communication, the court established a two-part test.249 First,
there must be an objective basis, founded on outward manifestations from the potential claimant, to believe that litigation is
imminent.'
Second, the party must have a subjective good
faith belief that litigation by the particular plaintiff will ensue."5 Information will not be protected by the party communication exemption unless both tests are met. 2
In applying this test in Flores, the court considered the
facts that: (1) "the report was printed on a standard form"; (2)
"it was usual and customary to prepare such a report in every
case that was set for a prehearing conference"; and (3) Flores
had not outwardly shown that he intended to sue until he filed

245. Id. at 336-37.
246. Id. (citing Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard, 720 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tmcx 1986, orig.
proceeding)); see also Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1977, orig.
proceeding) (holding that documents prepared in connection with other lawsuits were
discoverable in a workers' compensation action); Victoria Uoyds Ins. Co. v. Gayle,
717 S.W.2d 166, 168 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (finding
that an insurer's claims file, which was not discoverable in the insured's action for
personal injuries, was not privileged in a later action brought by the insured alleging the insurers misrepresentations and fraud); Service loyds Ins. Co. v. Clark, 714
S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, orig. proceeding) (allowing discovery of
insured's investigation files in the insured's later suit for bad faith insurance practices).
247. 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1989, orig. proceeding).
248. Id. at 38-39.
249. Id. at 40.
250. Id at 40-41.
251. Id. at 41.
252. Id. It is currently unclear how this anticipation of litigation test will apply
to plaintiff-created work product. For a discussion of the possibilities, see Abright,
supra note 4, at 819-23.
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his notice of intention to appeal." Therefore, the court found
that the report was prepared in the ordinary course of business.'
The investigator's subjective conclusion that Flores
would file suit-because it was unsupported by any outward,
objective threats of suit-was
insufficient to create a party com5
munication protection.2
The Flores two-prong analysis was applied to determine the
starting point for anticipation of litigation in the party communication context in Powers v. Palacios.' The Powers court
held that the trial court had properly granted a protective order
with regard to the investigative claim file of the defendant's
insurance company. 7 A demand letter sent by the plaintiffs
attorney eight months after the incident in question "was a
sufficient outward manifestation to indicate the imminency of
litigation and the good faith belief that litigation would ensue."' Similarly, in Child World v. Solito,25 9 the court held
a demand letter to be enough to form the basis for a "subjective
good faith belief that the plaintiff would sue.2 ' The court was
not convinced that the plaintiffs failure to actually file suit
within the time threatened eliminated
the defendant's good
21
faith anticipation of litigation." '
The court discussed the first prong of the Flores analysis in
American Home Assurance Co. v. Cooper,2 6 2 a case which
arose from a truck driving team collision in which a woman
was injured and her husband killed.263 The court of appeals
reviewed the outward manifestations of imminent litigation,
which included (1) plaintiffs hiring a lawyer, (2) plaintiffs lawyer notifying the International Accident Board (IAB) of a dispute over coverage, and (3) the filing of a third party action
against the driver involved in the collision in which the insurance company (relator in the mandamus action) intervened.2"
The court determined that "under the Flores analysis the trial
court could have ruled either way within its broad discretionary

253. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 794 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 495.
259. 780 s.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding).
260. Id. at 956.
261. Id. at 956-57.
262. 786 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
263. Id. at 770.
264. Id. at 772.
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powers."'
The trial court's order, compelling production of
the adjuster's entire investigation file up to the filing date of its
notice of intent to appeal the IAB award, was not an abuse of
discretion.'
Note that in a suit against an insurance carrier for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the insurer's denial
of coverage is the occurrence or transaction on which the
plaintiffs suit is based.' Therefore, documents generated before this time cannot be protected as party communications.'
Further, it is the date when the denial is communicated to the
claimant and not the date that the insurer decides to deny coverage that controls.m
Pre-Flores cases that adopt a case-specific approach to party communications27 should still be reliable. However, preFlores cases that find a party's subjective belief in the likelihood of litigation to be sufficient7' are now suspect.
Litigation over the ending point of the party communication
privilege has been infrequent. Given its case-specific nature,
however, the privilege may easily end when the lawsuit ends.
2
In Maryland American General Insurance Co. v. Blackmon,
for example, the Texas Supreme Court discussed the exemption
in general terms and commented that "[t]he protection of a
party's right to defend a suit brought against him is the es265. Id.
266.
d. at 771-72. See also Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 35 Tx. Sup. Ct.
J. 587, 588 (March 28, 1992) (overturning a court of appeals order denying discovery
on the grounds that evidence before the trial court did not compel a ruling that the
first prong of the Fores test was met on any particular date prior to the date on
which the compensation carrier demanded reimbursement).
267. Jackson v. Downey, 817 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. App.-Houston flst Dist.]
1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (citing Gilbert v. Black, 722 S.V.2d 548, 550
(Tex. App.-Austin 1987)).
268. I& at 860.
269. Id
270. See, eg., Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard, 720 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex 1986, orig.
proceeding) (finding that documents prepared by the casualty insurer in connection
with settlement of a claim with its insured are not protected from discovery in a
later subrogation suit); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802
(Tex. 1986, orig. proceeding) (holding that information obtained in a post-accident
investigation by a railroad was discoverable because it was not obtained at a time
when the railroad had good cause to believe suit would be filed and stating that
.[t]he mere fact that an accident has occurred is not sufficient to clothe all postaccident investigations, which frequently uncover fresh evidence not obtainable
through other sources, with a privilege"); Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d
619, 621 (Tex. 1986) (holding that an investigator's report prepared in connection
with a potential workers' compensation claim was discoverable in a later personal
injury action).
271. See Lone Star Dodge, Inc. v. Marshall, 736 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tx.
App-Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding).
272.
639 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982, orig. proceeding).

282

HOUSTONLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

sence of the proviso in Rule 186a [now Rule 166b(3)(d)], and
8 Thus, the
the privilege exists so long as that right exists."
27 4
exemption may disappear when the suit ends.
Both the party communication and witness statement exemptions are subject to being overridden if the party seeking
discovery can show that she "has substantial need of the materials" and that she is "unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means." 275 Texas lawyers have largely ignored this provision,
but it is a significant safety valve for the potential burdens
created by the party communication and witness statement exemptions. In State v. Lowry,27 for example, the Texas Supreme Court determined that certain insurers sued by the state
2 77
for antitrust violations had made the necessary showing.
The "need" prong was satisfied by showing that the information
was gathered by the state in investigating the antitrust
claims. 2 ' The "hardship" prong was met because it would be
burdensome and extremely difficult for
the insurers to replicate
279
the materials amassed by the state.

E. Witness Statements
Rule 166b(3)(c) provides a qualified exemption from discovery for "[t]he written statements of potential witnesses and parties, . . . except that persons, whether parties or not, shall be

entitled to obtain, upon request, copies of statements they have
previously made concerning the action or its subject matter and
which are in the possession, custody, or control of any party."m As with party communications, the statement must
have been made "subsequent to the occurrence or transaction
upon which the suit is based and in connection with the pros-

273.
Id. at 457.
274.
See id. at 458. However, the exemption may end even earlier than the completion of the action. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Downey, 765 S.W.2d 555, 557.
58 ('ex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that severance of a bad faith claim
from a contract claim made work product discoverable). But see Owens-Corning

Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 ('ex. 1991, orig. proceeding)
(finding that work product protection does not end when a lawsuit ends).
275. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3). This treatment is consistent with the federal courts'
treatment of ordinary work product. See FED. . Civ. P. 26(bX3).
276.
802 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding).

277.
278.
279.

Id. at 673.
Id
Id- For a discussion of the federal case law interpreting the substantial

need/undue hardship override to the work product exemption, see generally Special
Project, supra note 165, at 800-11.
280. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(c).
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ecution, investigation, or defense of the particular suit, or in
anticipation of the prosecution ori defense of the claims made a
2
part of the pending litigation." 8
There has been very little litigation over the witness statement exemption. In one unreported case, Circus Vargas Corp. v.
Solito, 2 the court dealt with the "anticipation of litigation"
problem in the witness statement context. In Circus Vargas, a
car driven by John Karner struck a Circus Vargas truck that
was parked on the shoulder of a highway by Marvin
Wrighton. Mr. Karner died in the collision.' Two weeks after the accident, a representative of Circus Vargas' insurance
carrier contacted Mr. Wrighton by telephone and recorded his
recollection of the accident.'
Six months after the accident,
Karner's parents filed a wrongful death suit against Circus
Vargas and, during discovery, sought copies of witness statements made prior to the date suit was filed.'
Circus Vargas objected to the request and filed an affidavit
in which the insurer stated that (1) "[eighty-five percent] of
automobile-related fatalities result in litigation;" (2) "the chances of litigation increase when a corporate truck is involved;"
and (3) the representative believed litigation in this case to be
a "'near certainty.'"'
The court found this evidence insufficient to show anticipation of litigation for two reasons. First,
the insurer's affidavit demonstrated merely "'generic' anticipation," devoid of some outward manifestation of future litigation
by the Karners.
Circus Vargas failed to establish that, prior
to the taking of the statement, the Karners demanded damages,
hired an attorney, or commenced investigation of the accident.'
Second, the court rejected the witness statement
claim because Circus Vargas failed to produce evidence supporting its statement that eighty-five percent of automobile-related
fatalities resulted in litigation.m Because the anticipation of

281.

Id-

282. No. 01-88-00240-CV, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 1064 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.], May 4, 1988, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
283. Id- at *1.

284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id.
Id.

287.
288.

Id. at *1-°2.
Id. at *3.

289.

Id, at "3-'4 (citing Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. Marsh, 733 S.W.2d 359, 361

(Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, orig. proceeding)).
290. Id at *3 (citing Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc. v. Moore, 731 S.W.2d 137, 140
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding)).
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the witness statement
litigation requirement was not proven,
91
was not protected from discovery.

IV. TExAS RULES OF CIVIL EVIDENCE PRIVILEGES
A.

Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege, as it applies in civil cases, is
set out in Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence.2
The rule gives a client
the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client (1) between himself or his representative
and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, (2) between his
lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to
a lawyer, or a representative of a lawyer representing another
party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common
interest therein, (4) between representatives of the client or
between the client and a representative of the client, or (5)
among lawyers and their representatives representing the
same client.2 3
Surprisingly little litigation has been conducted over the attorney-client privilege in the discovery context.
As in all jurisdictions, one of the most difficult privilege
questions arises when a party is an organization rather than a
human being. In such cases, the court must decide who is a
"representative of the client" so that communications to and
from the representative qualify for the privilege. Rule 503 defines "representative of the client" as "one having authority to
obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client."'
Commentators
disagree over whether this definition limits client representatives to those in the "control group," that is, people high in the
corporate hierarchy, or whether the definition refers to a "subject matter test," thereby providing a privilege to people with
whom an attorney needs to communicate in order to render
legal services. 9 5 Read literally, the language of the rule could

291.

Id. at "3-*4.

292.

See TEx. R Civ. EVID. 503(b).

293.
294.

Id.
Id
See, e.g., 33 STEVEN GOODE ET AL., GUIDE To THE TEXAS RuLES oF EVICIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 503.3, at 237-38 (Texas Practice 1988) (stating un-

295.
DENCE:
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include any employee who in some way "acts" on the lawyer's
advice within the scope of her job duties. Such an interpretation would produce a very broad exemption indeed, especially
because the privilege encompasses communications both to and
from the client and even between client representatives. The
exemption would also be very broad because the attorney-client
privilege, unlike the Rule 166b exemptions, contains no anticipation of litigation requirement.'
So far, however, Texas
courts show no sign of such an expansive reading of Rule 503.
The most extensive discussion of the privilege, as it relates
to discovery, comes in Texas Department of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation v. Davis.27 The communications in issue
in Davis were reports written to TDMHMR's lawyer concerning
an investigation of the death of a resident of the Travis State
School.'
The court had to decide whether the communications were sufficiently "confidential" to be privileged and
whether the persons communicating with the attorney were
"representatives of the client."'
In deciding the issue of confidentiality, the court noted that
in order for a communication to be confidential, the client must
show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he did not intend the communication to be disclosed to third parties.' Because the court found no evidence that TDMHMR intended the
interviews and report to be confidential, that the interviewer
believed the information he gathered to be confidential, or that
the persons who signed the report believed it to be confidential,
the court found the privilege to be inapplicable."° The court
made this finding despite the existence of a letter from the
lawyer to the assistant superintendent of the school requesting

equivocally that Texas adopted the control group test); HULEN D. WENDOR? ET A.,

TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL V-33 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that Rule 503(a)(2)
may adopt both the control group and the subject matter test). For a general discussion of attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, see David Simon, 7e

Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE LJ. 953 (1956); Glen
Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege

for Corporations, 65 IowA L REV. 899 (1980). The most-cited cases discussing the
issue for federal courts are Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-11 (8th Cir. 1977, orig. proceeding) (en banc); and City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp.

483 (E D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
296.

Tnx. R. CIv. EVID. 166(b).

297.
298.
299.
300.

775 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding [leave denied)).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 472-73.

301.

Id. at 474.
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that the assistant superintendent "'[p]lease inform those staff
members participating in this investigation that the results are
to be treated as confidential and are to be reported to me only.' " ° No evidence showed that these conditions were agreed
to or that the investigation was in fact conducted under these
conditions.'
The court also held that the evidence was not sufficient to
establish that the people who prepared the report were client
representatives."°4 As noted above, Rule 503(a)(2) defines client representatives as persons "having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant
thereto, on behalf of the client."3°5 The investigation was conducted by three people: the chair of the school's client abuse
committee, the school's Chief of Fire Safety, and a TDMHMR
employee who was not an employee of the school.' The court
found insufficient proof that the three "were persons entitled to
engage in confidential communication, or were persons whose
participation was needed in order to facilitate rendition of any
legal services." " Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's
decision that the report was not privileged.'
Texas courts also have decided various privilege-related
issues in the discovery context and have analyzed the kinds of
information protected by privilege. In Allstate Texas Lloyds v.
Johnson' and Borden, Inc. v. Valdez,3 1 ° the courts noted
that the attorney-client privilege does not include such nonconfidential matters as the terms and conditions of an attorney's
employment and the purpose for which an attorney has been
engaged. 31'
Similarly, in Aetna Life & Casualty v.
Cochran,1 ' the court held that an insurance company's claims
handling procedure manual was not privileged simply because

Id.
302.
303.
Id.; cf Boring & Tunneling Co. of Am., Inc. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d 284, 290
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that a letter from an
attorney to an insurance adjuster, who had retained the attorney to represent the

insured, was privileged because it was made to facilitate the rendition of legal services and under circumstances indicating a desire for confidentiality).
304. Davis, 775 S.W.2d at 473.
305. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503(a)(2).
306. Davis, 775 S.W.2d at 470.
307. Id. at 473.
308. Id. at 474-75.
309. 784 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, orig. proceeding).
310. 773 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, orig. proceeding).
311. Allstate Texas Lloyds, 784 S.W.2d at 105; Borden, Inc., 773 S.W.2d at 720.
21.
312. No. 01-88-00490-CV, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 1348 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] June 2, 1988, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
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the company's attorney had assisted in the preparation of the
manual."' However, in Wiley v. Williams,3" 4 the court held
that a file containing copies of letters between the attorney and
the client's insurance carrier, conveying information regarding
the progress and handling of the plaintiffs claims, were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 3 5 Further, in Enos v.
Baker,31 the court held that the attorney-client privilege extended to non-party client files so that a lawyer's spouse in a
divorce case could not discover confidential communications
between the lawyer and the lawyer's clients in an attempt to
discover the value of the lawyer-spouse's law practice and prospective income. 1
Other opinions discuss duration and waiver issues. In Wood
v. McCown,"' arising from a civil suit alleging assault by an
employee that was brought after the employee's conviction in a
criminal proceeding arising from the same incident, the court
held that documents protected by the attorney-client privilege
in a criminal proceeding were similarly protected in the subsequent civil proceeding. 3 9 The court decided that "the privilege
is permanent unless waived."'
In Axelson, Inc. v.
McIlhany,"' the Texas Supreme Court held that because
there was evidence that documents reflecting the defendant's
internal investigation of kickback schemes at a gas well site
had been disclosed to the FBI, the IRS, and the Wall Street
Journal,the attorney-client privilege had been waived.'
The court in Ryals v. Canales' discussed the parameters
of the joint defense privilege.2 The court noted that parties
may assert the privilege when they are parties in the same
lawsuit, parties who are about to be in the same lawsuit and
are making their communications in anticipation of litigation,
or parties with common defenses against a plaintiff.' However, because the party opposing discovery and asserting this
privilege had provided only conclusory allegations tracking the

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id- at "2.
769 S.W.2d
Id. at 717.
751 S.W.2d
Id. at 949.
784 S.V.2d
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
798 S.W.2d
Id. at 554.
767 S.W.2d

324.
325.

Id. at 227-30.
Id. at 228.

715 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
946 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1988, orig. proceeding).
126 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, orig. proceeding).

550 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding).
226 (Te. App.-Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding).
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Rule 503, the privilege was not applied in the
language of
3 26
case.
Ryals
Texas courts have also had the opportunity to discuss the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.32 7 In
Freeman v. Bianchi,'2 for example, the court held that a party asserting the crime-fraud exception must make a prima facie
becase of a serious violation and must show a relationship
29
tween the violation and the document in question.3
B. Physician-Patient Privilege and Confidentiality of Mental
Health Information
Rule 509(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence provides
the general rule that "[c]onfidential communications between a
physician and a patient, relative to or in connection with any
professional services rendered by a physician to the patient are
privileged and may not be disclosed."' 0 Rule 509(b) also
states that "[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or
treatment of a patient by a physician that are created or maintained by a physician are confidential and privileged and may
for corresponding privinot be disclosed.""' Rule 510 provides
2
information.3
health
mental
for
leges
One of the exceptions to the privilege exists as to any communication or record relevant to a party's physical, mental, or
emotional condition if a party to the lawsuit relies upon the
physical, mental, or emotional condition as a part of a claim or
This exception, at minimum, attempts to prevent
defense.'
the offensive use of the privilege, i.e., when a party places his
or her physical or mental condition in issue and subsequently
attempts to use the privilege to conceal evidence of the condition.' The language of the rule itself is not limited to offen-

326.

Id. at 230.

327.

TEx. R CIv. EVID. 503(d)(1).

328. 820 S.W.d 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave
granted]).
329. Id. at 861.
330. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 509(b)(1); see also TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 510(b)(1). Regarding
the establishment of the physician-patient relationship, see Garay v. County of
Bexar, 810 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
331.

TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 509(b).

332. Id. 510(a)(2).
333. Id. 509(d)(4), 510(d)(5).
334. See Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985,
orig. proceeding) (holding that medical records are privileged unless used offensively);
Dossey v. Salazar, 808 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. pro.
ceeding [leave denied]) (holding that the psychotherapist-patient exceptions are intended to prevent offensive use of the privilege, but that the exception does not
apply when a patient does not put a condition in issue); Wimberly Resorts Property,
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sive use of privileged information and creates an exception
whenever the information is "relevant."=
Texas courts are split on the proper application of this
exception. For example, in Scheffey u. Chambers,' Scheffey,
a physician who was the defendant in the underlying medical
malpractice litigation, admitted himself to a California hospital
for treatment for cocaine addiction.' The plaintiffs sought
discovery of Dr. Scheffey's medical records, and the trial court
entered an order allowing the subpoena of his medical records
without an in camera inspection.m The court granted mandamus relief on the basis that Dr. Scheffey did not bring the
litigation and therefore was not using the privilege offensive-

ly.M
Justice Ellis, dissenting in Scheffey, stated that Rules
509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence
made the hospital records discoverable.3 0 Justice Ellis correctly pointed out that the statutory language creates the exception with regard to records or communications that may be
relevant to "an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies
on the condition as part of the party's claim or defense."3" In
other words, the evidence rules do not require the party
claiming the privilege to be the person who raises the issue
making the patient's condition relevant. In Scheffey, the medical records sought for discovery purposes related to the condition that allegedly rendered Dr. Scheffey unfit to perform surgery and were therefore relevant:
The nature and extent of Dr. Scheffey's cocaine addiction and
its attendant physical and mental effects upon him form the

Inc. v. Pfeuffer, 691 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, orig. proceeding) (holding that mental health records are privileged unless the plaintiff puts his health in
issue).
335. TEx. IMCiv. EVID. 504(d)(4), 510(d)(5).
336. 790 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Houstn (14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding
[leave denied]).
337. Id-at 880.
338. I&
339. Id. at 881; see also Dossey v. Salazar, 808 S.W.2d 146, 147.48 (Tem
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding (leave denied)) (holding that the
defendant patient did not bring the action nor make mental health an issue, and
therefore Rule 510(d)(5) was not applicable). Another court has taken the same approach, holding that despite its broad language, the exception to the mental health
information privilege is limited to offensive, not defensive, uses of the mental health
information. See M.P. v. Packer, 826 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig.
proceeding).
340. Scheffey, 790 S.W.2d at 881 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
341. Id at 882.
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basis of the Watsons' case. If the Las Encinas Hospital records
are not at the very least discoverable,then the Watsons would
be precluded from challenging Dr. Scheffey's self-serving testimony that he was not under the influence of cocaine while
treating any patients at his office or at any hospital. The
Watsons would be further precluded from challenging Dr.
Scheffey's self-serving testimony that his cocaine use had no
effect on him during non-use periods2 and did not effect [sic]
his care or treatment of Mr. Watson.2
A historical analysis of Rules 509 and 510 supports the
view that the exception is meant to eliminate the privilege
whenever the communication is relevant, regardless of which
party "relies" upon the medical condition. For example, the
original version of the exception in Rule 510 created an exception to the privilege if the information was relevant and if "the
patient/client is attempting to recover monetary damages for
any mental condition."1 3 The original exception, then, was
limited to cases in which the patient-privilege holder was the
litigant who put her mental condition in issue. In 1984, however, the exception was broadened to add cases in which, after
the patient's death, "any party" relied on the physical, mental,
or emotional condition of the patient as an element of a claim
The Committee on the Administration of the
or defense.'
Rules of Evidence specifically intended this change to broaden
the exception to include cases in which the patient was not the
party who raised the issue of mental condition."5 In 1988 the
rule was again rewritten, as was Rule 509. This time the committee adopted the "any party" language, which was created to
extend the exception to cases in which the patient does not
raise the issue making the privileged communication relevant,
and applied it to both living and dead patients." Now a communication falls within an exception to the privilege if it is
upon the condition as a part of
relevant and if "any party relies
7
defense."3
or
claim
the party's
In Cheatham v. Rogers,4 the court of appeals applied a
related privilege exception. The case involved Miriam Young, a
non-party mental health professional appointed by the court to

342.
Id.
Tex. R. Evid. 510(d)(5), 46 TEx. B.J. 205 (1983).
343.
344. Tex. RL Civ. Evid. 510(d)(5), 47 TEx. BJ. 937 (1984).
Letter from M. Michael Sharlot to Newell H. Blakely (Apr. 30, 1984) (Sup345.
plement to the Agenda for the May 18, 1984 Committee meeting) (on file with the

authors).
346.

TEX. R CIV. EVID. 509(d)(4), 510(d)(5).

347.

Id.

348.

824 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).
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counsel children as part of a divorce decree. 9 When Young
recommended that the father's access to the children be terminated, the father responded by seeking copies of Young's own
psychological or psychiatric records and to depose her concerning these records.'
The father claimed that Young's own
mental health was relevant to impeach her expert opinion and
that the records were therefore discoverable under Rule
510(d)(6), which creates an exception for cases "when the disclosure is relevant in any suit affecting the parent-child relationship.""' Young objected on the basis of the Rule 510 privilege, but the court rejected the privilege claim.2"
Courts have also discussed the scope of the privilege. For
example, in Midkiff v. Shaver,' the trial court had determined that the plaintiffs' entire medical records were discoverable in a suit seeking damages for mental anguish that allegedly arose from the mishandling of the plaintiffs' insurance claim
for water damage to a building and the building's contents.'
The court of appeals held that the discovery order was overly
broad. ' Because the plaintiffs' allegation of mental anguish
did not place their mental condition at issue, discovery should
have been limited to only those medical records related to the
medical attention sought by the plaintiffs for the symptoms of
their mental anguish claims.&
C.

Other Privileges under the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence

Texas recognizes a husband-wife communication privilege
under which a person, whether or not a party, has a privilege
during and after marriage to refuse to disclose and to prevent
others from disclosing a confidential communication made to a
spouse while the person was married, unless the communication was made in furtherance of crime or fraud.3 7 However,
the privilege is not applicable to a proceeding between spouses,
a commitment or similar proceeding, or a proceeding to establish competence.' The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence also pro-

349.
350.

Id. at 232.
Id. at 232-33.

351.

Id. at 233-34.

352.

Id.

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

788 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 400.
Id at 403.
Id.
TEx. . CIv. EVID. 504.
See i& 504(d)(2)-(4).
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vide for a privilege for communications to clergy, 35 9 a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of a person's vote at a political election conducted by secret ballotm and, under certain
circumstances, a privilege from disclosure of a trade secret. 1
V. NON-RULE PRIVILEGES
In addition to the privileges contained in the rules of civil
procedure and in the rules of civil evidence, a number of privileges are contained in statutes or case law and may be asserted
during discovery. Examples of statutory privileges include hospital committee and other medical records privileges, the privilege protecting certain lobbying activities, a reporter's investigative file privilege, a bank's privilege from disclosure of information concerning customer transactions, and the law enforcement
privilege.
A.

Hospital Committee and Other Medical Records

Section 161.032 of the Health and Safety Code recognizes a
privilege protecting the records and proceedings of certain medical organizations. 2 This statute provides that the records
and proceedings of a medical committee are confidential and
are not subject to court subpoena.'
This statutory privilege
protects the deliberations of hospital committees.2 The privileged "records and proceedings" include documents that have
been prepared by or at the direction of the committee for committee purposes, but do not protect all documents gratuitously
submitted to a committee or created without committee impetus
and purpose. 36 The statute protects only the "deliberative
3
process" and not routinely accumulated information.
Courts have consistently held that committee minutes and
reports are privileged. 7 In considering other documents,

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See
See
See
See
Id.

id. 505.
id. 506.
id. 507.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.0 3 2(a) (Vernon 1992).

364.
Jordan v. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 701
S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding).
365.
Id. at 647-48.
366.
Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. 1988); see also Jordan,
701 S.W.2d. at 648.
367.
See, e.g., Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at 648 (holding that committee reports are
privileged to allow open and thorough review unless waived by disclosing them to a
grand jury); Harris Hosp. v. Schattman, 734 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, no writ) (holding that minutes of a committee meeting were non-discov.
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courts examine them to determine whether the hospital asserting the privilege has proven that the documents either disclosed committee deliberations or were prepared by or at the
direction of the committee for committee purposes. Courts have
held that: (1) letters or memoranda not requested or generated
by a committee were not within the privilege;m (2) reports
made by a doctor at the request of one of the hospital's administrators, because there was no evidence that the request was
made for committee purposes or with committee impetus, were
not privileged;' (3) a doctor's handwritten "Notes to the File"
were not privileged because they were not shown to be created
for or by the direction of a committee;"' (4) checklists used to
keep track of when a doctor's license will expire, what letters of
reference have been received, and various identification numbers, were discoverable as documents kept in the ordinary
course of business;3 ' (5) letters from members of various committees or departments to doctors who were under review by
the committees or departments, discussing the committee's action or finding, were privileged; 2 and (6) letters from the
hospital's chief of staff requesting information, letters providing
the information, and letters discussing the information, where
requested by a committee for a committee purpose, were privilegedY
The hospital committee privilege was held impliedly waived
with respect to the record of a meeting of a hospital staff to

erable unless waived by disclosure); Santa Rosa Medical Ctr. v. Spears, 709 S.W.2d
720, 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, orig. proceeding) (holding that committee reports are privileged unless voluntarily disclosed).
368. See, eg., Barnes, 751 S.W.2d at 496 (holding that letters, which requested
information on the credentials and experience of two of a hospital's doctors, and a
listing of letters, mailed and received by the hospital during the application process,
were "routine administrative records* and that a letter from one of the doctoer's insurance carriers was a 'gratuitously submitted document"); Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at
648; Doctor's Hasp. v. West, 765 SAV.2d 812, 814-15 (rex. App.-Houston [let Dist.]
1988, orig. proceeding) (holding that letters from hospital administrators requesting
background information concerning doctors, letters from doctors or administrators to
the hospital providing recommendations or background information, letters requesting
information from a doctor concerning a case under review, letters providing information concerning a medical procedure performed by a doctor, and letters from the
hospital's assistant administrator to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners
were not shown to be privileged because they were not generated at the request of
a committee for committee purposes).
369. See Doctor's Hosp., 765 S.W.2d at 815.
370. See Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at 648.
371. See Doctor's Hosp., 765 S.W.2d at 815.
372. See id.
373. Freitag v. Trevathan, No. 01-89-0012-CV, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 397, at "4
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
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review the circumstances of a patient's suicide (a "psychological
autopsy") in Terrell State Hospital v. Ashworth,37 4 a case
which arose from a negligence action against a state hospital.1 5 After a patient's suicide, a representative of the
patient's mother sent a list of questions concerning the patient's
death to the hospital's superintendent, who reviewed the psychological autopsy before responding to the questions. 37 Although the "psychological autopsy" itself was not disclosed, the
superintendent's response included information, opinions, and
conclusions found in the report. 7 The court stated that while
a partial disclosure of "any significant part" of privileged material can result in an implied waiver of additional non-disclosed
material,378 such an implied waiver is "not an automatic,
blanket waiver of all underlying materials," and the scope of
the implied waiver is within the discretion of the trial
court.3 79 Because the trial judge could have determined after
examining the "psychological autopsy" that the superintendent's
response disclosed a "significant part" of the material, and because the hospital failed to show a clear abuse of discretion,
discovery of the entire report was allowed in the negligence
action.3 °
The Medical Practice Act also makes the reports, determinations of, and communications to medical peer review committees confidential and privileged in civil judicial or administrative proceedings. As amended in 1987, section 5.06() of the
Medical Practice Act provides:
[u]nless disclosure is required or authorized by law, records or
determinations of or communications to a medical peer review
committee are not subject to subpoena or discovery and are
not admissible as evidence in any civil judicial or administrative proceeding without waiver of the privilege of confidentiality executed in writing by the committee.3 1
Under this statute, any person seeking access to privileged
information must plead and prove waiver of the privilege."s
For example, in one case, the defendant physician and a hospital claimed that a district judge abused his discretion by order-

374.

794 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding).

375.

Id. at 938-41.

376.

Id, at 939.

377.
378.
379.

Id at 940.
Id
Id. at 941.

380.
381.

Id. at 940-41.
Tsx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06(j) (Vernon Supp. 1992).

382.

Id.
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ing the production of documents concerning the competency and
the credentials of the physician at the hospital, including materials relating to an investigation of the physician's medical
conduct and documents concerning any withdrawal of his medical or surgical privileges.' The court concluded that mandamus was appropriate, based in part on the applicability of article 4495b to hospital peer review committees~3 Significantly,
the court was unwilling to engraft the limitations on the claims
of privilege under article 4495b that are applicable to claims of
privilege under Sections 161.031 and 161.032 of the Health and
Safety Code.'
Various other public health statutes contain reporting and
confidentiality requirements that might become relevant during
discovery disputes. For example, the Communicable Disease
Prevention and Control Act contains extensive reporting and
confidentiality requirements concerning communicable disease
test results. W
In addition, another statute makes the medical and donor
records of a blood bank confidential. 7 However, the statute
also provides that the blood bank may be required by a court of
competent jurisdiction, after notice and hearing, to provide a
recipient of blood from the blood bank with results of
tests-with donor identification deleted-of the blood of every
donor of blood transfused into the recipient.3m Under certain
circumstances, a court may order discovery relating to the do9
as

nor.
B.

Other Privileges

1. Lobbying activities. The Texas Government Code prohibits the public disclosure of a written or otherwise recorded

383. See Northeast Community Hosp. v. Gregg, 815 S.W.2d 320, 321-22 (Tez.
App.-Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding).
384. Id. at 326.
385. Id.
386. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 1992). But ace
Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-Ft.
Worth 1988, orig. proceeding) (holding a health regulation prohibiting disclosure of
donor information inapplicable to court proceedings because the legislature had enacted a separate statute limiting court actions on blood banks).
387. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 162.003.
388. Id. § 162.010.
389. Id. § 162.011. Some pre-statute cases held that an order requiring a blood
center to identify blood donors in a wrongful death action based on a blood transfusion resulting in death from AIDS is not a violation of the constitutional right to
privacy. E.g., Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr., 745 S.W.2d at 554-60; Tarrant County
Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 677-80 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1987, orig.
proceeding).
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communication from a citizen of Texas to a member of the legislature, unless either party authorizes disclosure.' 9 This provision was held to prevent discovery, in a civil case, of documents submitted to lobbyists and copies of documents distributed to91 state representatives in support of proposed legislation.
2. Reporter's privilege. In Channel Two Television Co. v.
Dickerson,92 the court recognized and applied a qualified
privilege protecting information that the press obtains through
its investigations.393 The court held that because of the Texas
constitutional provision that "no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press, "39 once the privilege is asserted, the party seeking discovery of the reporter's
investigative materials must demonstrate that there is a compelling and overriding need for the information.3 95 At a minimum, the party seeking discovery must make a "clear and specific showing in the trial court that the information sought is:
(1) highly material and relevant; (2) necessary or critical to the
maintenance of the claim; and (3) not obtainable from other
available sources."' Because no such showing was made in
the Channel Two case, the reporter's notes, outtakes, records,
and other documents were not discoverable. 97
Similarly, in Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia,8 the
court of appeals discussed at length the parameters of the
reporters' privilege and the burdens of establishing and refuting
the privilege.3 The court required parties seeking to overcome a claim of reporters' privilege 41 to show substantial evi-

390. TEx. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 306.004 (Vernon 1988).
391. See Inwood W. Civic Ass'n v. Touchy, 754 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tax.
App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (denying a homeowners' association discovery of Houston Cable's lobbying efforts in support of a law
giving cable companies free access to utility easements across private property),
392. 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding).
393. Id. at 472; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that a
television newsman-photographer was required to testify at a trial regarding civil
disobedience which he had witnessed, but that the trial judge needed to ensure that
the questioning was pertinent and proper).
394. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 8.
395. Channel Two, 725 S.W.2d at 472.
396. Id
397. Id.
398. 822 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding).
399. See idl. at 677-85.
400. The reporters had met their burden of establishing the existence of the priv.
ilege by filing affidavits from the reporter/authors stating that they had assured
certain news sources of confidentiality. Id. at 679. The reporters also averred that
the articles . . . were not based solely on the confidential sources, but were also
based on numerous record sources and approximately 20,000 pages of documents .
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dence of falsity, to show that they had exhausted alternative
sources of information, and to show that the matters attributable to the confidential source were material and critical
to the discovering party's case.4"' The Garcia court found that
the plaintiffs had not yet made the required showing.
3. Non-disclosure of records of financial institutions. Section 1 of the Texas Banking Code provides the general rules of
nondisclosure applicable to financial institutions.4" A financial institution is prohibited from disclosing the records of a
depositor, owner, borrower, or customer of the institution who
is not a party to a proceeding unless the court orders disclosure
and the depositor, owner, borrower, or customer consents in
writing to such a disclosure. 3 Section 5(a) provides a narrow
exception to the general rules of nondisclosure contained in
Section 1, allowing "the use or disclosure by a bank of information or records pertaining to deposits, accounts, or bank transactions if the use or disclosure... is made by the bank in the
course of the litigation affecting its interests. "4°4
In Texas National Bank of Victoria v. Lewis, °s the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals denied a bank mandamus
relief.'
The trial court had ordered the discovery of "all
documents contained in any files for 224 of the bank's customers" in a declaratory judgment action against a former employee, which sought a declaration that the former employee was
owed no money under his contract.0" The employee filed a
counterclaim, alleging various causes of action in tort and, during the course of discovery, requested the bank to produce the
documents in question for his inspection. 43' The trial court denied the bank's motion for protection. 4° In denying mandamus, the court of appeals emphasized that the statute was
unclear and that at the time the trial court had acted, no case

.. " Id at 679 n.3. The affidavits also recited that 'many of the confidential
sources feared retaliation against them if their identities [were] disclosed.* Id.
401. Id. at 680.
402. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 342-705, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
403. Id
404. Id. § 5(a).
405. 793 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
406. Id. at 86.
407. Id at 84.
408. Id
409. Id.
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law was available to guide the trial court in its interpretation
of the statute.4 10 The appellate court found that:
The trial court fashioned an order allowing the discovery but
provided some protection of confidentiality for the bank's customers. This balancing of interests under an ambiguous
statute to achieve the necessary discovery while protecting the
privacy addressed by the statute is a proper exercise of the
trial court's discretion. The statute is not so clear and unequivocal that it imposes an absolute duty on the trial court
to compel protection.4 '
4. Law enforcement privilege. In Hobson v. Moore,412
the Texas Supreme Court recognized in dictum a privilege for
law enforcement officials to withhold the types of documents
protected by section 3(a)(8) of the Open Records Act.4 13 The
Open Records Act exempts from disclosure records of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors that deal with the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime and the internal
records and notations of such law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors which are maintained for internal use in matters
4 14
relating to law enforcement and prosecution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The clear trend over the past several years has been to
increase the scope of discovery, both by broadening the definition of relevance and by limiting the scope of privileges. Parties
to litigation can now discover anything, if it is not privileged,
that might be material to an issue in the lawsuit, unless the
burden of producing the information is substantially greater
than the potential importance of the information. This information may be different in substance or in time from the actual
facts at issue in the lawsuit.
At the same time, amendments to the rules of procedure
and developing case law have narrowed the scope of many privileges. The old investigative privilege was eliminated by rule
amendment. The work product, party communication, and witness statement privileges have been made case-specific and
subjected to both subjective and objective tests of "anticipation

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 86.
Id.
734 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1987, orig. proceeding).
Id, at 340-41.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17A, § 3(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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of litigation." Protection for expert witnesses is narrower than
it used to be. Even the attorney-client *privilege, at least as
currently interpreted by case law, has been narrowed through
the requirement of confidentiality and the limits on who can be
a client's representative for purposes of attorney-client privilege.
Despite these developments, the philosophy driving the
discovery system continues to be in a state of flux. Formerly,
discovery was disfavored and privileges were highly protected.
During the past fifteen years, Texas courts have promoted discovery, expecting litigants to be forthcoming with information
and have viewed claims of privilege with suspicion. These developments have not been welcomed by everyone. As one appellate court noted: "Query: What has become of our traditional
Texas adversative system of trying litigation? Answer: 'Gone
with the wind.'"4 15 This response, however, misjudges the
needs of the adversary system. While the system may require
an adversary presentation of evidence before an uninvolved
decisionmaker, it does not require a completely adversarial
process of information gathering.1 Texas courts have reasoned correctly that the purpose of discovery is to reveal all
relevant information, so that cases will be decided based on
that information.
More recent cases, however, suggest that relevance may
retreat and the privileges regain importance. For example: (1)
the work product exemption has been held to be "perpetual,"
and the implications of that decision may dramatically lengthen
the time parameters of many Rule 166b discovery exemptions;
(2) discovery of relevant net worth information has been curtailed; and (3) while the scope of relevance for impeachment
purposes has been clarified somewhat, it has been left in a
kind of inspecific limbo that may lead trial courts to continue
417 Unto deny discovery of relevant impeachment information.

415.
Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. Sanderson, 739 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987, orig. proceeding).
416. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery A Critique

and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L REV. 1295 (1978) (discussing the costs associated with an adversarial discovery system and proposing reforms for the discovery

process).
417. Although the procedures required to litigate discovery disputes are beyond
the scope of this article, one should also note that the Texas Supreme Court has
recently changed the rules regarding the availability of mandamus review in a way
that will make it easier for parties resisting discovery to obtain immediate review
and harder for parties seeking discovery to obtain immediate review. Walker v.
Packer, 827 S.V.2d 833 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding). For a discussion and analysis

of the policies underlying the new Walker limits on mandamus, see Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Afterword, in THE TEXAS LITIGATION READER at 152 (1992). See generally

Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose
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fortunately, the pendulum may be about to change direction
again, back to a time when discovery practice resembled courtsanctioned blind man's bluff or hide-and-seek. The result of
such changes truly would be a fool's game.41 s What we need
instead is a fair game. Let's hope we get one.

Time Has Come, 44 Sw. L.J. 1045 (1990).
418. Cf. Albright, supra note 4, at 781 (suggesting that the "anticipation of litiga.
tion" standard is antiquated and that the Texas courts' reliance upon this standard
is misguided).

